Desired Features and Design Methodologies of Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols in the Public-Key Infrastructure Setting by Wang, Hao-Hsien
Desired Features and Design Methodologies of
Secure Authenticated Key Exchange Protocols in




presented to the University of Waterloo
in fulfilment of the




Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2004
c© Hao-Hsien Bobby Wang 2004
AUTHOR’S DECLARATION FOR ELECTRONIC SUBMISSION OF
A THESIS
I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of
the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.
I understand my thesis will be made electronically available to the public.
ii
Abstract
The importance of an authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocol has long been
known in the field of cryptography. Two of the questions still being asked today
are (1) what properties or features does a secure AKE protocol possess, and (2)
How does one, in a step by step fashion, create a secure AKE protocol? This thesis
aims to answer these two questions.
The thesis contains two parts: one is a survey of previous works on the desired
features of the Station-to-Station (STS) protocol, and the other is a study of a pre-
viously proposed design methodology in designing secure AKE protocols, as well as
contributing an original idea of such methodologies. Descriptions and comparisons
of the two design methodologies are included.
The thesis surveys the literature and conducts a case study of the STS protocol,
analyzes various attacks on STS through some known attacks to it, and extracts
the desired properties and features of a secure AKE protocol via the case study.
This part of the thesis does not propose any new result, but summarizes a complete
list of issues one should take consideration of while designing an AKE protocol. We
also show that at the end of this part, a secure version of STS which possesses the
desired features of an AKE protocol.
The other major part of the thesis surveys one design methodology of creating
a secure AKE protocol by Bellare, Canetti, and Krawczyk; it is based on having
a secure key exchange protocol then adding (mutual) authentication to it. The
thesis then proposes another original design methodology; it starts with a secure
mutual authentication protocol, then adds the secure key exchange feature without
modifying overheads and number of flows of the original mutual authentication
protocol. We show in this part the “secure” AKE protocol developed through
these two design approaches is identical to the secure version of STS described in
the other part, and thus possesses the desired features of a secure AKE protocol.
We also give a proof of security of the secure AKE protocol developed under our
design methodology.
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In the world of secret-key cryptography, a secure communication between two par-
ties A and B can be thought of sending messages in an encrypted form using a
secret commonly known to only A and B (so no one else should know the secret).
This secret is referred to as a key, or in this case, a secret key. This simple technique
of encryption using a secret key can be dated back to ancient times. In the old
times, the two parties A and B agreed on a common key by meeting in person and
coming up with the secret. However, in today’s world of computing, secure commu-
nications are often needed between parties, even though they may never have seen
each other before (and they may live on opposite sides of the planet). Suppose two
people, Alice (A) and Bob (B), want to talk to each other securely but they have
never met each other in person. The immediate problems in conducting a secure
communication will be: 1) how does A know that she is really talking to B, and
2) how does A establish a key sk with B without seeing B in person? With the
introduction of a trusted third party, certificates, and public key cryptography, the
two problems seem to be solved easily. However, due to the much heavier computa-
tion of public key techniques than secret key ones, the practical solution of secure
communication is to establish a common secret key sk using public key techniques,
then encrypt messages using secret key cryptography with sk. Therefore, the above
two problems still need to be solved. The first problem is usually referred to as the
problem of authentication and the second as key exchange. It is often desirable that
the solution should be a protocol achieving both authentication and key exchange
at the same time. Such a protocol is called an authenticated key exchange (AKE)
protocol.
A lot of research in key exchange has taken place in order to establish se-
cure AKE protocols, discuss and debate desired features of AKE protocols, prove
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the protocols are indeed secure, and ensure that the models resemble real life
situation as a foundation of proof of security. In the traditional Public-Key-
Infrustructure (PKI) setting, there are protocols such as Lim-Lee ([LL95]), the
United Model Protocol ([IEEE00]), MQV ([MQV95, LMQSV03]), STS ([DOW92]),
Yacobi ([Yac91]), Ateniese-Steiner-Tsudik ([AST98, AST00]), Oakley ([Orm98]),
SKEME ([Kra96]), IKE ([HC98]), etc. One example of an industrial standard
for authenticated key exchange is ISO/IEC 11770-3. Since 1995, research articles
such as [BCK98, BR93A, Sho99] have developed different (yet somewhat similar)
models and given proofs of security for different protocols. There are also survey
articles (e.g., [BWJM97] and [BW99]) on key exchange protocols. [BW99] also
discusses the design methodology and some goals or desired properties of a secure
AKE protocol. Another approach to authenticated key exchange, namely ID- or
password-based AKE protocols, has been under development since its introduction
in the year 2000. For example, Katz, Ostrovsky, and Yung (in [KOY02]) have re-
searched, in ID-based setting, secure AKE protocols (the KOY protocol), proofs of
security and the corresponding model, and some desired features an AKE protocol
should have (such as forward secrecy).
This thesis is a survey of the desired properties and design methodologies of
authenticated key exchange protocols in the PKI setting. Unlike in [BW99,
BWJM97], we specifically focus on the desired properties (or goals) and design
methodologies and gives more details and analysis rather than just giving a de-
scription of the surveyed items. The motivations for doing so are as follows:
1. The desired features, or the goals of a secure AKE protocol are really the
driving factor of a security model (which thus impacts the proof of security
of a protocol). Without proper inspection of the desired features, a security
model could be too strict (giving too much power to the adversary or requiring
something that is not important) or too loose (missing essential or critical
features/goals in the security model). If a model is too strict, then a “secure”
protocol may be hard to design in practice; if a model is too loose, then a
protocol designed under the model is simply not secure enough in the real
world.
2. It’s been noticed that many existing protocols, whether provably secure or not,
are originally designed almost out of “thin air”. That is, there is no standard
process of creating an AKE protocol that can be proven secure. This ad-hoc
approach to designing protocols may involve repetitively creating identical
security models and giving proof of security. Having a design methodology
that guarantees outcome protocols to be secure can simplify the above work
and may re-use existing work for new development.
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3. Although ID-based cryptography seems more convenient and more closely
resembles the current network setting, the majority of applications (such as
granting permission of access, electronic banking, electronic voting, etc.) are
still being operated under the traditional PKI setting. Before the next work-
ing infrastructure replaces the current PKI, work on AKE protocols in the
PKI setting can help people immediately.
The desired features of an authenticated key exchange protocol are demon-
strated through a case study of the Station-to-Station (STS) protocol. Since the
first introduction of STS in 1992 ( [DOW92]), flaws have been found (also in other
protocols, too) and fixes have been proposed, thus creating several variations of
STS. In 1998, [BCK98] investigated a modular approach to the methodology of
creating authenticated key exchange protocols and suggested and proved security
of a variation of the STS protocol, generally referred to as the BCK protocol (see
later chapters); this brings up the discussion of different methodologies of designing
a secure AKE protocol. Other than the ad-hoc approach and Bellare, Canetti, and
Krawczyk’s modular approach, this thesis further discusses a third approach based
on secure mutual authentication protocols and the security of Diffie-Hellman key
exchange.
The organization of the thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 very briefly introduces
the general background, common goals, and tools of cryptography. Chapter 3 gives
the mathematical background essential to this thesis. For readers who are familiar
with commutative groups, Z∗p groups for p being a prime, elliptic curves, the dis-
crete log problem (DLP), and the Diffie-Hellman problem (DH, including the com-
putational Diffie-Hellman problem, CDH, and the decision Diffie-Hellman problem,
DDH) can skip this section. Chapter 4 describes the formal models used to prove
security of protocols. The chapter surveys three most relevant models: the Bellare-
Rogaway model of the symmetric setting, the Blake-Wilson-Menezes model of the
asymmetric setting, and the Bellare-Canetti-Krawczyk modularization model. The
Bellare-Rogaway model, although not as relevant to this thesis, is described to ex-
plain concepts and terminologies. The other two models are explained according
to their description in the original article. Chapter 5 discusses the desired features
of authenticated key exchange protocols through a case study of the STS protocol.
Some further background information is introduced, including key establishment
protocols (key transport versus key exchange protocols), authentication and mu-
tual authentication. A list of desired features of a secure AKE protocol is compiled,
and some other examples of protocols, proofs of security, and discussions on exist-
ing standards are given. Chapter 6 discusses the different design methodologies
of creating a secure AKE protocol. The ad-hoc approach (or the Bellare-Rogaway
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Model Compliance approach), the modular approach in [BCK98], and Stinson’s
progressive approach are described and compared. The last chapter presents con-




Background and Terminology of
Cryptography
2.1 Goals of Cryptography
The goal of an encryption scheme is to achieve confidentiality or secrecy. That is,
the data sent from Alice to Bob cannot be understood by an unauthorized party.
In the field of cryptography, there are many other goals for secure communication.
This section gives some “hand-waving” definitions of goals of cryptography for
readers with no prior knowledge to cryptography. The formal definitions of some of
the goals crucial to this thesis are associated with different cryptographic models
and will be explained in later sections. For readers who already have a good sense
of what each goal means, this section can be skipped. Below is a list of the goals
(these definitions are greatly inspired by and inherited from [StiA]):
• Confidentiality: confidentiality means that the data transferred from one
party to another cannot be understood by an unauthorized party.
• Data Integrity: data integrity means that the data transferred cannot be
modified by an unauthorized party without being detected.
• Entity Authentication or Identification: this means the verification of a
particular entity (I am who I claim I am). In general, the term authentication
will mean refer to entity authentication.
• Data Origin Authentication: this goal ensures that the data transmitted
is from a particular source.
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• Mutual Authentication: the two parties (say A and B) in a communication
are confident that: 1) A is sure that she is talking to B, and B is indeed com-
municating with her, and 2) B is sure that he is talking to A, and A is indeed
talking to him. Note that mutual authentication is not just authentication
both ways, but it also means that the intended participants “match”.
2.2 Cryptographic Tools
Throughout the development of cryptography, many tools or “modules” have been
established to serve one or more goals of cryptography. Below is a list of some
cryptographic tools associated with this thesis. Unlike the previous section, formal
definitions of cryptographic tools are given in this section, as well as a brief expla-
nation of what the tools are. One cryptographic tool this thesis does not mention
here is the key establishment protocol. It is highly related to the focus of this thesis,
and is left until later sections.
• encryption schemes ([StiB]): encryption is used to achieve confidentiality.
Examples of encryption schemes are RC4, RC5, DES, 3DES, RSA, and AES.
Formally speaking, an encryption scheme is a five-tuple (P , C,K, E ,D), where:
1. P is a finite set of possible plaintexts.
2. C is a finite set of possible ciphertexts.
3. K, the key space, is a finite set of all possible keys.
4. For each K ∈ K, ∃ an encryption rule eK : P → C, eK ∈ E and a
corresponding decryption rule dK : C → P , dK ∈ D such that for all
x ∈ P , dK(eK(x )) = x .
• signature schemes([StiB]): a signature scheme can be thought of as some-
one (say A) signing a contract or a letter, so whoever receives this letter knows
that it was signed by A and no one else. A signature scheme is used to achieve
data integrity and data origin authentication. Formally, an signature scheme
is a five-tuple (P ,A,K,S,V) where the following conditions hold:
1. P is a finite set of all possible messages.
2. A is a finite set of possible signatures.
3. K is a finite set of all possible keys.
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4. For each K ∈ K, ∃ a signing algorithm sigK : P → A, sigK ∈ S and a cor-
responding verification algorithm verK : (P×A) → {true, false}, verK ∈
V such that for all x ∈ P and for all y ∈ A,
verK(x , y) =
{
true if y = sigK(x )
false if y 6= sigK(x )
• Hash Functions([StiB]): A hash function is a function h : X → Y , where
X , Y are sets of texts, Y is finite, X may or may not be finite, and the size
or cardinality of Y is much smaller than the size of X . Hash functions can be
used to construct short fingerprints of some data. When a transferred message
m is altered, then its hash value h(m) will no longer be valid. Hash functions
are often used for message digests or to provide data integrity. When a hash
function takes a key as part of its input, then such a hash function is called
a keyed hash function and can be used as a message authentication code (see
below). Some famous examples of hash functions are SHA and SHA-1.
• Message Authentication Codes(MACs)([StiB]): A MAC is used to
ensure that the message transmitted has not been modified (data integrity).
Even though MACs serve similar purposes as signature schemes, the security
requirements are different. An example of a MAC is HMAC, a standard
proposed by NIST based on the SHA-1 algorithm.
2.3 Levels of Security
There are two types of measurement of security (in the example of encryption
ciphers, we can use measurement of secrecy instead): unconditional security
and computational security. In simple words, unconditional security means
that the probability of an adversary achieving his goal (it can be decrypting a
ciphertext, or forging a valid signature given a particular message, etc. – in any
case it would be forging some string m′ to be another string m) is no greater
than “guessing” what m should be. Computational security, however, is when
the adversary cannot achieve his goal if his computing power and time constraints
are limited. Given enough computing power and time, an adversary can always
break a computationally secure system. The point here is to clarify that public-key
cryptosystems are “provably secure” only based on the underlying computationally
hard problems, but not unconditionally secure. Formally speaking,
Definition: A cryptosystem is unconditionally secure if Pr[x|y] = Pr[x] for all
7
x ∈ P , y ∈ C. That is, the a posteriori probability that after observing ciphertext
y, the plaintext is x, is identical to the a priori probability that the plaintext is x.
That is, the adversary cannot do better than guessing what the plaintext x is,
even when he has seen the ciphertext y and regardless how much time or computing
power he has. One example of unconditionally secure cryptosystems is the One-
Time Pad. For description and proof that it is unconditionally secure, the readers
are referred to [StiB].
Some cryptosystems, such as the RSA encryption scheme, relies on some “dif-
ficult” mathematical problems (RSA relies on the difficulty of factoring products
of two or more large primes). It is easy to see that given limited computing power
but enough time, a composite number can always be factored. Such cryptosystems
are said to be only computationally secure.
The examples of One-Time Pad and RSA demonstrate the difference between
unconditional security and computational security. In any public-key cryptosys-
tems, unconditional security is never possible; the term “secure” would really mean
computationally secure. In later chapters, the term “provable security” of an AKE
protocol does not mean “unconditional security” since AKE protocols discussed
in this thesis are all in the public-key setting. Rather, the term “provable secu-





In any public-key cryptosystem, part of the user A’s “secret” is always known to
the public; given enough time and computing power, one can always retrieve the
value of A’s secret. Therefore, “security” in a public-key setting always refers to
computational security, and such security is based on very difficult mathematical
problems, such as the integer factorization problem or the discrete log problem
(DLP). The integer factorization problem is described as follows: given an integer
n, find the unique factorization n = pe11 × pe22 × ... × pekk , where p1, p2, ..., pk are
distinct primes and e1, e2, ..., ek are non-negative integers. The discrete log problem
is described as: Given a commutative group G, a generator α of a subgroup 〈α〉⊆ G,
and an element y ∈ 〈α〉, find the smallest non-negative integer x such that y = αx.
3.1 Commutative Groups
A group is an ordered pair (G, ·), where G is a set and · is a binary operation on
G. If one element a ∈ G operates another element b, we write a · b. G is called a
group if it satisfies the following four properties:
1. For all a, b ∈ G, a · b ∈ G.
2. (a · b) · c = a · (b · c) for all a, b, c ∈ G.
3. There exists an element e ∈ G such that, for all element a belong to G,
a · e = a.
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4. For all a ∈ G, there exists another element a−1 ∈ G such that a · a−1 =
a−1 · a = e.
A commutative group is a group that satisfies the fifth property:
5. a · b = b · a for all a, b ∈ G
As an example, the set of integers is a commutative group under multiplication
since for all integers a, b, a · b = b · a. However, the set of 2× 2 matrices, each entry
being integers, under the operation of matrix multiplication, is not.
3.2 The Group of Z∗p and Elliptic Curves
Generally speaking, many difficult mathematical problems used in cryptosystems
are defined in some group. A cryptosystem can be implemented in different ways
just by changing the underlying group from one to another. Regarding the purpose
of this thesis, two relevant commutative groups, namely Z∗p and Elliptic Curves (EC)
are introduced. Protocols such as MQV are originally proposed with underlying
group EC, but can be described as having Z∗p as its underlying group. For simplicity
and consistency, protocols described in this thesis can all be, and are assumed to
be, based in the group of Z∗p.
3.2.1 The group of Z∗p
By the formal definition of a group, the group Z∗p should really be written as (Z∗p, ·).
The set Z∗p is defined as Z∗p = Zp\{0} = {1, 2, . . . , p−1}, and the binary operation ·
is multiplication modulo p, where p is a prime number. For an element α ∈ Z∗p, the
operation α · α can be represented as α2, and the number 2 is called the exponent
of the expression α2. Similarly, if there are k copies of α (that is, α · α · . . . · α︸ ︷︷ ︸
k copies
),
then it can be expressed as αk, and the exponent of αk is k.
In the field of cryptography, there are many relevant theorems and concepts
associated with this group (such as the Euclidean algorithm, the Chinese Remainder
Theorem, quadratic residues, the Lagrange Theorem, etc.). The readers can refer
to any undergraduate-level group theory textbook for more information.
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3.2.2 Elliptic Curves
An elliptic curve is denoted by (E,⊕), where E is a special point ϑ (called the
point at infinity) and a set of points {(x, y)} which are solutions of a bivariate
cubic equation over a field F (for more information on fields, please also refer to
an undergraduate textbook). The binary operation ⊕ of an elliptic curve is called
point addition. The bivariate cubic equations are of the form:
y2 + a1xy + a3y = x
3 + a2x
2 + a4x + a6
where a1, a2, . . . , a6 ∈ F.
If the characteristic of F is not 2 or 3, then the above equation can be written
as
y2 = x3 + ax + b
where a, b ∈ F.
If the field F has characteristic 2, then the elliptic curve equation can be sim-
plified to the form
y2 + xy = x3 + ax + b
where a, b ∈ F = Z2 = {0, 1}.
Elliptic Curve Point Addition
The operation on elliptic curve points follows the rules below:
1. For all points P ∈ E, ϑ ⊕ P = P ⊕ ϑ = P , where ϑ is the point at infinity
(in other words, ϑ is the identity of the group).
2. Let P = (x1, y1) 6= ϑ, x1, y1 ∈ F. The inverse of P = (x1,−y1) is denoted by
−P .
3. Let P , Q be two points in the set E. The operation P −Q means P ⊕ (−Q).
4. P ⊕P can be denoted as 2P . Similarly, if k copies of P are added, the result
is denoted as kP .
Let the points P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2), where x1, y1, x2, y2 ∈ F, and
P, Q 6= ϑ, Q 6= −P .
11
1. If F has characteristic 6= 2 or 3:
Let P + Q = (x3, y3). The inverse of P is −P = (x1,−y1).
If P 6= Q, then
x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2
y3 = λ(x1 − x3)− y1
where λ = y2−y1
x2−x1 .
If P = Q, then
x3 = λ
2 − x1 − x2





2. If F has characteristic 2, then let P + Q = (x3, y3). The inverse of P is
(x1, x1 + y1).
If P 6= Q, then
x3 = λ
2 + λ + x1 + x2 + a
y3 = λ(x1 + x3) + x3 + y1
where λ = y1+y2
x1+x2
.
If P = Q then
x3 = λ
2 + λ + a
y3 = x
2
1 + (λ + 1)x3




3.3 The Discrete Logarithm Problem and the Diffie-
Hellman Problems
As mentioned in previous sections, public-key cryptosystems can only be compu-
tationally secure and not unconditionally secure. In this section, we will introduce
three hard problems relevant to the rest of the thesis that are based on the groups
described in the previous section. These are the underlying problems used to secure
the public-key cryptosystems used in practice today; once these problems can be
easily solved, the current public-key cryptosystems are pretty much broken.
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3.3.1 The Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP)
The formal description of DLP is as follows. Given the description of a finite field
Fq, q being the order of the field, a generator α ∈ F∗q, and another element h in the
cyclic subgroup generated by the generator α, 〈α〉, find the exponent k such that
h = αk.
Note that the previous two groups, Z∗p and elliptic curves, both satisfy the
conditions for inputs of DLP.
Specifically, the Z∗p version of DLP would be as follows: given the finite field Z∗p,
where p is a prime number, a generator α ∈ Z∗p, and an element h ∈ 〈α〉, find the
exponent k such that h = αk.
Unlike the similar notation of general fields and Z∗p, the elliptic curve version
of DLP may be confusing. The description of the problem is as follows: given an
elliptic curve E, a generator α = (xα, yα) ∈ E, and an element H ∈ 〈α〉 = {iα : i ∈
Z}, find the exponent k such that H = kα.
In general, when discussing the security of a public-key cryptosystem, one of
the assumptions is that the discrete logarithm assumption must hold, for otherwise
the cryptosystem will be insecure. In simple words, the discrete logarithm assump-
tion (DL assumption) states that the DL problem is intractable given reasonable
computing power and time.
3.3.2 The Computational and Decision Diffie-Hellman Prob-
lems (CDH and DDH)
The Computational and Decisional Diffie-Hellman problems are a consequence of
the DLP and Diffie-Hellman key exchange. The two problems are usually thought
to be representing two different levels of security. In the following, the two problems
are stated and will be compared. The readers should keep in mind that the notations
will be in generic form. Therefore, the expression αk in Z∗p is written as is, but in
elliptic curve notation it is written as kα. In both cases, the term exponent means
k.
Before describing CDH and DDH, we will first describe the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange.
The Diffie-Hellman key exchange is described as follows: There are two partic-
ipants A and B involved in this process. Without loss of generality, suppose A is
the initiator (who sends the first message to the other participant) and B is the
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Figure 3.1: The Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange
responder (who receives the first message and responds to it). Let p be a prime
and α a generator of Z∗p, the first step 1) is: A uniformly randomly selects an ex-
ponent a ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p − 1} and sends β1 = αa to B. 2) Upon receiving β1, B
uniformly randomly selects another exponent b ∈ {1, 2, . . . , p− 1} and computs the
key k = βb1 = α
ab. B then sends the value β2 = α
b to A. 3) Upon receiving β2,
A computes k = βa2 = α
ab. Therefore both A and B have computed the same key
k = αab. This completes the Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
The computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH) is stated as follows: given
a description of a finite field Fq, a generator α ∈ F∗q, two elements β1 = αa and
β2 = α
b, where a, b ∈ Z and 0 < a, b < q, find αab.
The decision Diffie-Hellman problem is the following: given a description of a
finite field Fq, a generator α ∈ F∗q, three elements β1 = αa, β2 = αb, and β3 ∈ 〈α〉,
output ‘yes’ if β3 = α
ab, output ‘no’ otherwise.
It is easily seen that DDH polynomial-time-reduces to CDH, and CDH can be
reduced in polynomial time to DLP. Therefore, it is generally believed that the
DDH assumption represents a lower standard of security than the CDH and DL
assumptions.
Note: Similar to the DL assumption, CDH assumption means that the compu-
tational Diffie-Hellman problem is intractable given reasonable computing power
and time. The DDH assumption means that the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem
is intractable given reasonable computing power and time.
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Chapter 4
Formal Models of Authenticated
Key Exchange
Key exchange, as explained before, is the process of establishing a shared secret
between two parties for subsequent cryptographic usage. Authenticated key ex-
change, is the process of key exchange plus each entity identifying him/herself to
another. In analyzing security of authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols, one
of the core task is to answer the questions “What is a secure AKE protocol?” and
“How do I show that a particular AKE protocol is secure?”
4.1 Notion of Security
For a long time in the development of cryptography, the notion of security has been
approached in an ad-hoc fashion (or the attack-response approach): a cryptosystem
is developed, and an attack comes up, a new cryptosystem is developed to fix the
problem, and another attack comes up, etc. With such an approach, no guarantees
at all are given to a particular cryptosystem; the best statement that can be made
with this approach is that a cryptosystem has not been broken yet and the system
has not been fully analyzed. Therefore, a better assurance of security is needed.
The two most commonly used tools for formally analyzing the security of a
protocol are provable security and formal methods. In particular, provable security
tends to formalize the communication model, the attacker’s capabilities, and to
give a proof based on definition of “security” associated with the model. On the
other hand, formal methods tend to analyze a protocol in a systematic way to
find flaws in a protocol. The immediate implication is that the usages of the two
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methods can be complementary to each other, but formal methods, although they
may spot flaws in a protocol very effectively, may not guarantee the security of
a system. Therefore, in terms of demonstrating the security of a cryptosystem,
provable security is usually preferred. In this thesis, we will analyze protocols in a
provable-security fashion.
A formal model treatment of authenticated key exchange protocols not only
gives a tool for analyzing the protocol, but suggests an infrastructure for proving
security, as well as a formal definition of security. Therefore, before discussing the
desired features of an AKE protocol, it is helpful to survey previous work on formal
models.
The rest of this section is organized as follows: the first subsection will include
informal definition of secure authenticated key exchange; the rest of this section
describes three formal models used to treat AKE protocols. The first model is by
Bellare and Rogaway in the symmetric, or private-key setting. The second model
is the Blake-Wilson-Menezes model in the asymmetric, or public-key setting. The
third model is by Bellare, Canetti, and Krawczyk in the asymmetric setting. The
notion of security and assumptions used in the rest of this paper will be mostly
based on the Blake-Wilson-Menezes model. However, it will be easier to explain
the link between real-life situations and the formalization by firstly introducing
the Bellare and Rogaway model. The third formalization, the Bellare-Canetti-
Krawczyk modularization model, is especially relevant to the design methodology
of authenticated key exchange protocols that we study in later chapters. Note that
other than the three models described in this section, there is only another one by
Shoup ([Sho99]). However, most of the material in [Sho99] is not directly relevant
to the issues we are considering. Therefore, we will not discuss Shoup’s model in
this thesis.
4.2 Informal Definition of Security
The term authenticated key exchange did not appear in the literature at the be-
ginning of cryptography. For a long period of time, people either did not focus on
this issue, or they stressed authentication and key exchange as separated issues. It
is now believed that in terms of designing a secure system, these two issues should
really be considered as one. In particular, [Mao] suggests that if authentication is
separated from key exchange, some work will be redundant and the overall security
may not be easy to achieve.
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After surveying several articles related to this topic, two (informal) attributes
are thought to be essential to authenticated key exchange:
1. Secrecy of the session key. If the adversary can learn any information
about the session key developed by two parties A and B, then obviously any
subsequent communication using the session key will be vulnerable to attack.
Therefore, the adversary should not learn anything about the exchanged ses-
sion key.
2. Mutual authentication of the two entities in the protocol run. If A wishes
to establish a key with B via an authenticated key exchange protocol, not
only will she want to be sure that she has exchanged the key with B at the
end of the protocol run, but she also wants B to be sure that he has exchanged
a session key with her, too.
These two principles seem to be very simple, but their formalization is somewhat
difficult. The following subsections on formal models describe different attempts to
capture the real security of an AKE protocol formally. Although no formalism can
capture every single real-life scenario, these formalizations still model the essential
parts of communication.
4.3 General Background of Provable Security
The need for provable security was firstly noticed during the 1980s. By 1985,
provable security had been achieved in many areas including by Yao [Yao82] and
Blum and Micali [BM84] for pseudo-random number generators; Goldwasser and
Micali [GM84] for probabilistic encryption; and Goldwasser, Micali, and Rivest
[GMR88] for digital signatures. However, not until 1992 were authentication and
authenticated key exchanges looked at in a systematic way. Diffie, van Oorchot,
and Wiener [DOW92] introduced the attributes desirable in an AKE protocol and
showed security by demonstrating attacks on the protocol with the removal of a
certain feature. In 1993, [BR93B] first put different desirable attributes into a model
covering not just the desired attributes of a protocol, but also the communication
and adversarial models. Since then, more research had been carried out in this
field and it became clear which features of a system should be looked at in order
to analyze the security.
In general, the analysis of a protocol must take the following items into account:
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• The Communication Model: the modelling of analysis should resemble real
life computing and communication. Issues regarding this item include the dis-
tributed computing environment; public-key versus secret-key setting; whether
(in the public-key setting) certificates are present and how they are distributed
to users; number of users; single or multiple sessions, etc.
• The Attack Model: this simulates the capability of the adversary and should
reflect the real-life situation as much as possible. If the adversary’s ability is
over-estimated in the analysis, then it may be unreasonably difficult to design
a secure protocol to comply with the security requirements. If, on the other
hand, the attack model proposes weaker abilities of the adversary than a real
life one, then the protocol designed according to this attack model simply
is not secure. The common abilities of an adversary include eavesdropping,
delaying or dropping messages, injecting and modifying messages. Notice that
the attack model may vary slightly depending on the goals of the adversary
and the protocol. There is also a difference between passive and active attacks.
• The goal of the cryptosystem and the goal of the adversary: depending on
the purpose of the cryptosystem, the goal of the adversary may be different.
These two goals contribute to the definition of a secure cryptosystem. If any
of the goals are inappropriate, the resulting cryptosystem may be insecure
in real life, and may damage other parts of a larger system that uses this
particular cryptosystem.
• Definition of security.
In order to prove the security of a protocol, [BWM97] combines the above
features along with the description of protocol. It suggests five steps in proving
security of a protocol:
1. Specification of the model (including a formalization of the communication
model and the attack model)
2. Definition of goals: including the goals of the protocol and the adversarial
goals. This further clarifies the definition of security.
3. Statement of assumptions: assumptions about the underlying mathematical
problems, certain constraints of user interactions, etc.
4. Description of the Protocol
5. Proof that the protocol meets its goals within the assumed model.
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The five steps give a very clear way to prove security. In different approaches
and design methodologies, the steps may be organized differently or the steps may
be mixed up. However the above five steps are essential to consider when proving
the security of an AKE protocol.
4.4 The Bellare-Rogaway Model of Authenticated
Key Exchange
[BR93B] is the first treatment that formalizes authenticated key exchange proto-
cols. A unified model is given that captures not just the way of communication,
but also the adversary’s ability in the communication model. Also, many real-life
constraints are included as part of the model, or treated as assumptions. Associ-
ated with the formal model is a formal definition, using attributes derived from the
model, of authenticated key exchange.
4.4.1 Connection: Real Life to Formalization
Before describing the model, it is easier to explain the connections between real
life scenarios and their formalized forms. By doing so, readers can get a better
understanding why a model is constructed in a certain way, and may relate more
closely to real-life situations when understanding the model. Although one may
be concerned that not all the subsequent research in this field follows the model of
[BR93B], in all the subsequent work the concept of transferring a real-life scenario
into a formalized form is very similar, if not the same, to the model proposed
by Bellare and Rogaway. Therefore, it is very important to mention Bellare and
Rogaway’s contribution converting real events into a formalization.
This subsection will start by listing real life situations and then explain in plain
English the way and reason of modelling the situation into a certain formalism. The
idea is to explain the communication model and then explain how and why it is
transformed into the formalization of Bellare and Rogaway’s model. The adversarial
model, the goals of an authenticated key exchange protocol, etc., are discussed.
The Communication Model
The communication model used in Bellare and Rogaway’s model is in the secret-
key cryptography setting. That is, before people wish to communicate with one
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another, they must have an a priori shared secret. Theoretically, the number of
participants in the communication model can be infinite, although in practice this
will never be the case. Users who wish to establish the pre-determined secret
should use a perfect random number generator, although in practice it is usually
a pseudo-random number generator good enough that we assume acts close to
perfectly random. There is a protocol that is associated with the communication
model. Specific to our purpose, a protocol is run between two users only, but the
two users may run the protocol many times for key exchange. At the end of each
protocol run, one side of the protocol (a participant) may accept or reject the other
party’s identity and the established key. For simplicity, each protocol run is called
a session, and the key developed at the end of the protocol run is referred to as
the session key. One session involves at least one message transfer from one party
to another; this is called a flow. In a session, a user either receives a message from
the previous flow and then sends its output to the other user; it initializes a session
(if it is first flow of the protocol); or it receives the last message of the session and
decides whether it accepts or not. Of course, in order to make such decisions, each
user itself may have a certain rule to decide what to do next in the session and it
may require a random number generator or probabilistic algorithm. Each user uses
a computer that performs polynomially many operations only.
The Adversarial Model
The adversary is thought of as existing in environment such as the internet. Its
capabilities include eavesdropping on messages; mixing up the order of sent mes-
sages; dropping one or more messages in the communication; injecting or modifying
messages in the wire; impersonating a legitimate user; participating in the com-
munication model itself as a legitimate user; or requiring one or more particular
sessions to expose their session keys (the known session key attack). However, the
adversary’s computing power is also polynomially bounded.
The Goal of Authenticated Key Exchange
Defining the security of authenticated key exchange is difficult; it is hard to specify
what requirements a protocol must and must not meet in order to be a secure AKE
protocol. Bellare and Rogaway in [BR93B] gave their definition as follows:
A protocol Π is a secure authenticated key exchange protocol, then it must be 1)
a mutually authenticated protocol, 2) if the adversary does not alter any messages
(i.e. we have a passive attacker), then both parties of the protocol will accept (if
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they are honest), and 3) the adversary should not know anything that enables him
to retrieve the session key with a greater chance of success than guessing its value.
Consequently, their definition of mutual authentication is as the follows:
A protocol is called a secure mutual authentication protocol if for the polynomial-
computing-powered adversary,
1. Assume all users keep their records of conversation. If there is a session
between users i and j, and they are both aware of this session plus they think
they are talking to each other in this session, both of the two users and they
should both accept.
2. There should not be a case where some legitimate user i has a conversation
record of some session π, i accepts, but there are no other legitimate users
holding a corresponding matching record of conversation.
Formalization
We now explain how the real-life scenario is converted into formalization.
Modelling the execution of authenticated key exchange protocols can be thought
of as an experiment with different components. The secret key setting, where every
user shares a secret with another user to start with, is captured by a key generator
G. In real life, each user pair may determine the shared secret by themselves, and
each pair’s secret may be different. The formalization models this as G choosing
the secret for each pair based on a random input given to G at the start of the
experiment. Also, every pair of users get the same secret a. It may be due to
the fact that Bellare and Rogaway originally developed the model for a potential
possibility to distribute keys to multiple users in a user group sharing the same
secret. The key generation process is that a central key generation algorithm starts
with a random input and is also in charge of distributing the keys secretly, since
all users are supposed to choose their secret keys using a perfect random number
generator and agree upon the secret key in a secure manner. However, the identical
secret for every pair seems unrealistic. This event is not only rare in real life, but
it eliminates the possibility of modelling another real-life scenario: that if a person
learns the secret of a pair of users i and j, then a secure system should not allow
the adversary to be able to know the secret key between any other user and i or j.
However this is not the case in this model.
All the users in the “experiment” are thought of as a set, denoted by I . For
simplicity each user is identified by a natural number i. The user set I is finite. The
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“sessions” between each user pair are captured by two instances of the protocol.
For simplicity we will call these “sessional protocols”. If i runs a session with j,





represents i’s point of view of this session: i believes that it is talking to j for the sth
time since the start of the experiment. More generally, s is the session ID i keeps
to itself as a reference. Similarly, Πtj,i represents that j believes that it is talking to
i with session ID t. This type of modelling captures that the key exchange protocol
is only between two users i and j, but each of them may have several sessions with
the other user. Notice that the two sessional protocols’ session identifier may or
may not be the same. This is due to the adversary’s ability of trying to pretend to
be one entity and talking to the other. Also, between each pair i, j there may be
an arbitrary but finite number of such sessional protocols.
Note: in the original paper the term “sessional protocol” does not exist. The
author has created this term to distinguish a protocol Π, which possesses a set of
rules, and each session of the protocol (which is denoted in the form Πsi,j).
Due to the modelling of a session, the messages transferred in a session are then
captured as inputs to and outputs from a sessional protocol. The sessional protocol
Πsi,j takes an incoming message sent from j to i, perhaps performing some rules of
calculation and decision making (this is captured by calling the protocol Π), then
outputs a message sent back to j. The outputs of Πsi,j not only include the outgoing
message to the other party, but also its decision of whether to accept or reject as
well as the agreed session key. This type of formalism also include the uncertainty
that a party does not necessarily receive messages sent by the other party.
The adversary, with the ability of eavesdropping, mixing the order in which
messages are delivered, requiring the session key from a particular session, partici-
pating as a legitimate user, dropping messages, injecting messages, impersonating
a legitimate user (with polynomially bounded computing power) is modelled as a
separate entity in the model. The adversary is said to be a polynomial time prob-
abilistic algorithm (to capture that the adversary’s computing power is limited).
The adversary does not belong to the user set (although in reality the adversary
may be a legitimate user itself). The adversary also has a secret key and all other
information a legitimate user of the protocol may have. Such information is again
distributed by a central algorithm such as G. All its capabilities are captured by
the whole model being at its control with a certain level of limitations. Since a ses-
sion is captured by two sessional protocols Πsi,j and Π
t
j,i, the input to the sessional
protocol is controlled by the adversary (capturing message-injection, dropping, and
mixing order of messages), and the output, except for the computed secret key, is
known to the adversary (capturing eavesdropping). To capture known session key
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attacks, another type of query, called reveal, is introduced. The query to a sessional
protocol Πsi,j returns the resulting session key if there is one, and it returns the null
value otherwise. Together with the adversary having the same type of information
as the rest of users, it allows the adversary to play in the protocol as a legitimate
user as well.
4.4.2 The Model
After the transition from plain English description to this formalism capturing
methodology, this subsection is the formal description of Bellare and Rogaway’s
model. The organization is somewhat different from the original paper, but the
author believes that the way described in this thesis may be more clear. The
description will start with the preliminary notations, terminologies, assumptions,
and details to make the whole model well-defined. Then the model is described
from the “big picture” down to details, where details may or may not be mentioned
in the preliminary part.
Preliminaries
• The set of finite binary strings is denoted by {0, 1}∗. The set of finite binary
strings of length at most k is denoted as {0, 1}k. The set of infinite binary
strings is denoted as {0, 1}∞.
• The concatenation of two strings str1 and str2 is written as str1||str2.
• A function ε(k) is said to be negligible if for all c > 0, there exists a kc > 0
such that ε(k) < k−c for all k > kc.
• The security parameter: it is often associated with every cryptosystem,
and is denoted by k. In unary form, the security parameter is represented as
1k.
• The set of users: as described before, it is denoted by I . Users are also
referred to as the participants or the players of a protocol. In the two-user
setting, the identity of the sender or the initiator of the protocol is usually
denoted by A(or Alice), and identity of the (intended) partner or responder
is denoted by B(or Bob). In a more general setting (i.e. two users or more),
the identity of the sender is denoted by i and the identity of the intended
partner denoted by j. Sometimes the notation i, j and A, B are interchanged
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for simplicity of explanation. Each individual user’s identity is represented
by a finite binary string in {0, 1}k of length at most k (k is the security
parameter).
• The Long-Lived Key (LL-Key): also referred to as the secret of the sender
or the private key of the sender. In the symmetric setting of the Bellare-
Rogaway model, all users i ∈ I receive the same LL-key, denoted by a. the
secret a belongs to the set {0, 1}∗. The LL-keys in Bellare and Rogaway’s
model are generated and distributed by the LL-Key Generator G.
Running the Protocol
Running the protocol in this case means the execution of the “experiment” discussed
above. Again, a protocol run in the usually sense is referred to as a “session”. After
describing the preliminary items, the formal description of the “experiment” is given
as follows:
The model consists of a key exchange protocol Π, an adversary O, a LL-key
generator G, and a specified security parameter k. The protocol is an algorithm,
running in polynomial time, that takes the input (i, j, a, κ, r) and gives the output
(m, δ, α). i represents the identity of the sender, j represents the identity of the
intended receiver, a represents the secret key of the sender, κ is a record of con-
versation, and r is a random input. i, j ∈ I , a ∈ {0, 1}∗, κ ∈ {0, 1}∗, r ∈ {0, 1}∞.
In the output, m is the “next message” to send out, δ is the decision of whether
the sender accepts or not, and α is the “private output” given to the sender only.
m ∈ {0, 1}∗∪{∗}, where ∗ means the sender sends no message. δ ∈ {A, R, ∗}, where
A means accept, R means reject, and ∗ means undecided. α ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∪ {∗}, where
∗ means “no change in internal state”.
The LL-key generator G is a polynomial time algorithm which takes the input
(1k, i, rG) and output and delivers a private key ai = G(1k, i, rG) to user i in a
secure manner. In the input, 1k is the security parameter, and rG is a random
input. [BR93B] assumes that the secret value ai = aj for all i, j ∈ I . The LL-key
generator also generates the key for the adversary, but it is specified to be aO =
G(1k, i, rG) = λ, where λ represents the empty string. In Bellare and Rogaway’s
model the value of each secret key is just a prefix of the random input string rG,
and the length of the secret key varies with each individual protocol specification.
Each sessional protocol is denoted by Πsi,j, where i, j, s is as described above.
Each sessional protocol in the formalization is activated (or called) by the adversary
for some input queries. Upon receiving queries, the sessional protocol itself calls the
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protocol Π and gets the output returned by Π. After receiving the output (which
may include private information updates, the sessional protocol updates its internal
state as described by the output of Π, then returns to the adversary the appropriate
information retrieved from Π. Each Πsi,j is also associated with a unique record of
conversation, denoted by κsi,j, indicating message sender i’s view of the protocol
flow so far.
The adversary, denoted by O and sometimes referred to as Oscar, is a polynomial-
time probabilistic machine that has access to infinite number of sessional protocols
Πsi,j. Before the adversary starts running it takes the input parameters (1
k, aO, rO),
where 1k is the security parameter, aO is the private key generated by the LL-key
generator for the adversary, and rO ∈ {0, 1}∞ is a random input. The adversary is
capable of sending queries to each sessional protocol representing passive and active
attacks. If the adversary is deterministic and faithfully delivering messages to the
corresponding protocols, then such an adversary is called a benign adversary.
As described before, the adversary in the formal model has the control of what
to send to each sessional oracles. This is done via queries. To capture the ability
of the adversary, as well as to complete the modelling, the adversary is equipped
with three types of queries. They are the send query, the reveal query, and the test
query. Each type of query is explained in the following:
• The Send Query: this query takes the input (i, j, s, x), representing O send-
ing message x to entity i, claiming it is from j in session ID s, and the query
is answered by the sessional protocol Πsi,j.
To respond, the sessional protocol Πsi,j calls the protocol Π with input
(1k, i, j, ai, κ
s
i,j||x, rsi,j),
where rsi,j is the random input given to protocol Π
s
i,j at the beginning of a
protocol run (this will be discussed later). Π returns (m, δ, α) to Πsi,j. Then
Πsi,j updates κ
s
i,j to be κ
s
i,j||x, and returns (m, δ) to the adversary.
Notice that the term send query did not appear in the original paper. How-
ever, it is more convenient to distinguish this original query type with the
other two. Also, in later work on authenticated key exchange modelling,
many researchers have used such a term, thus we name it send at this point.
• The reveal Query: this query enables the adversary to ask any sessional
protocol to return its session key. To simplify the notation, if the sessional
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protocol is Πsi,j, then the corresponding session key will be sk
s
i,j. The format
of the reveal query is (i, j, s, reveal), and Πsi,j returns sk
s
i,j to adversary.
During the protocol run, if a reveal query is sent, then Πsi,j is said to be opened.
Otherwise, it is said to be unopened.
• The test Query: it is to test whether the adversary is successful in terms
of attacking the key exchange protocol. More will be said about this type of
query later.
Finally, running the protocol will mean the following:
1. The initialization phase: the random numbers rG ∈ {0, 1}∞ (for the LL-
key generator), rO ∈ {0, 1}∞ (for the adversary), and rsi,j ∈ {0, 1}∞ (for each
sessional protocol Πsi,j) are generated. The LL-key generator G then generates
the secret keys ai = G(1k, i, rG) and distributes them securely to each entity
i ∈ I . G also generates the secret information aO and sends it (securely) to
O. All the records of conversation κsi,j are initialized to λ.
2. The adversary now issues Send and Reveal queries according to his own (prob-
abilistic) rules.
3. After sending a certain number of queries, the adversary issues the Test query
with input (i, j, s, Test) to a certain sessional protocol. The protocol “tosses
a coin” and gets a random bit b ∈R {0, 1}. If b = 0, Πsi,j returns its session
key sksi,j. If not, then Π
s
i,j returns a random string from the key space. The
adversary receives the output string from the sessional oracle, and he guesses
what the random bit b is. The adversary’s success is then measured on the
probability of him guessing correctly the bit b (the conditions specifying which
sessional protocol can be sent a Test query is discussed later).
4.4.3 Definition of Security
The notion of a secure key exchange protocol in [BR93B] is explicitly defined us-
ing events of the protocol. In particular, [BR93B] first introduced the concepts
of matching conversation and indistinguishability of session keys to denote secu-
rity. The following subsections will discuss these concepts, the security of mutual
authentication, and links to running the model.
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Matching Conversation and Mutual Authentication
Recall that the informal definition of a mutual authentication protocol between
participants A and Bis: at the end of the protocol run, if Aaccepts, then she believes
that her intended participant is B, and she believes that B’s intended participant is
A, in this protocol run. So, what does that mean in a formal model?
In [BR93B], Bellare and Rogaway assert that if A is sure that she is talking to
B in a particular session, and B is also sure that he is talking to A in the same
protocol; both of them accept, then there must be two sessional protocols ΠsA,B and
ΠtB,A such that their record of conversation match each other’s and they should
both accept. In other word, they base the notion of mutual authentication on the
distribution of records of conversation and decisions.
Suppose the record of conversation of a particular sessional protocol Πsi,j is
written in the following form:
κsi,j = (t1, α1, β1)||(t2, α2, β2)|| . . . ||(tw, αw, βw)
where tl denotes the time it receives the query, αl is the input of the query, and βl is
output of the query, l = 1, . . . , w. If α1 = λ then i is called the initiator, otherwise
it is called the responder.
The formal definition of matching conversation is as follows:
Definition: Without loss of generality, let the number of flows R of a protocol
Π be odd, and let A be the initiator and B be the responder. Running Π with adver-
sary O and consider the two sessional protocols ΠsA,B and Π
t
B,A with corresponding
record of conversation being denoted as κsA,B and κ
t
B,A.
1. κtB,A is a matching conversation to κ
s
A,B if there exist times t0 < t1 < . . . < tR
and α1, β1, . . . , αρ, βρ such that κ
s
A,B is prefixed by
(t0, λ, α1)||(t2, β1, α2)||(t4, β2, α3)|| . . . ||(t2ρ−4, βρ−2, αρ−1)||(t2ρ−3, βρ−1, αρ)
and κtB,A is prefixed by
(t1, α1, β1)||(t3, α2, β2)||(t5, α3, β3)|| . . . ||(t2ρ−3, αρ−1, βρ−1).
2. κsA,B is a matching conversation to κ
t
B,A if there exist times t0 < t1 < . . . < tR
and α1, β1, . . . , αρ, βρ such that κ
t
B,A is prefixed by
(t1, α1, β1)||(t3, α2, β2)||(t5, α3, β3)|| . . . ||(t2ρ−3, αρ−1, βρ−1)||(t2ρ−1, αρ, ∗)
and κsA,B is prefixed by
(t0, λ, α1)||(t2, β1, α2)||(t4, β2, α3)|| . . . ||(t2ρ−4, βρ−2, αρ−1)||(t2ρ−3, βρ−1, αρ).
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In simple words, if two parties have a matching conversation, with A being the
initiator and B being the responder, then every message sent out by ΠsA,B, except
possibly the last message, is faithfully delivered to ΠtB,A, with the response to this
message being returned to ΠsA,B as its own output.
To demonstrate this concept, consider a very simple 3-flow protocol. Without
loss of generality, let Alice be the initiator and Bob the responder. In the first flow,
Alice sends Bob message m1, and Bob sends Alice the second flow message m2.
Then Alice sends the third flow message m3 to Bob, the protocol terminates. Also
assume that Alice thinks she is talking to Bob for the sth time, and Bob thinks he
is talking to Alice for the tth time. Alice sends out the first message at time 0, and
Bob receives it at time 1. Bob then sends the second flow message at time 1, Alice
receives it at time 2, etc. The record of the first message then will be (0, λ, m1).
If Alice and Bob have a matching conversation, then Bob will have received the
message m1 and sent out m2 in the second flow. Therefore, Bob will have the record
(1,m1,m2), indicating at time 1 he receives message m1 and sends out message m2.
Alice receives the second message at time 2, sends out the third message m3, and
thus have a record (2,m2,m3). Bob receives the last message of the protocol, m3,
and has the record (3, m3, ∗). Therefore, Alice’s record of conversation κsA,B looks
like
κsA,B = (0, λ, m1)||(2,m2,m3)
and Bob’s record of conversation κtB,A looks like
κtB,A = (1, m1, m2)||(3,m3, ∗)
The two records are matching conversations to each other.
Figure 4.1 gives an illustration and explanation of the concept of matching
conversations. Notice, however, the record of conversation of each sessional protocol
is somewhat simplified to illustrate the concept. In Bellare and Rogaway’s model, a
sessional protocol’s input and output usually contain more than just the messages
themselves in the protocol flows. In general, if ΠsA,B and Π
t
B,A have a matching
conversation, then their record of conversation are in the form of
(t0, λ, α1)||(t2, β1, α2)||(t4, β2, α3)|| . . . ||(t2ρ−4, βρ−2, αρ−1)||(t2ρ−3, βρ−1, αρ)
and
(t1, α1, β1)||(t3, α2, β2)||(t5, α3, β3)|| . . . ||(t2ρ−3, αρ−1, βρ−1)||(t2ρ−1, αρ, ∗)
where αi and βi are the input/output being recorded. Figure 4.2 shows how it
works in the general case.
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of the Concepts of Matching Conversations
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Figure 4.2: Illustration of the Concepts of Matching Conversations in General
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In terms of mutual authentication, [BR93B] requires the assumption that the
protocol must involve at least 3 protocol flows. Bellare and Rogaway suggest that in
a mutually authentication protocol, when a party i accepts with conversation record
K, then there must exist another party with an engaged matching conversation K’.
Also, each party should accept in the ‘absence’ of the adversary.
Before describing the formal definition of secure mutual authentication in [BR93B],
the term No−MatchingO(k) must be introduced. No−MatchingO(k) is the event
where with a polynomial time adversary O and security parameter k, there exists
a sessional protocol Πsi,j which accepts, but there is no corresponding oracle Π
t
j,i
engaging a matching conversation with it. Then [BR93B]’s definition of mutual
authentication is given as follows:
Definition: A protocol Π is a secure mutual authentication protocol if for any
polynomial time adversary O,
1. If two sessional protocols ΠsA,B and Π
t
B,A have a matching conversation, then
both sessional protocols accept.
2. The probability of event No−MatchingO(k) happening is negligible.
[BR93B] also mentioned the uniqueness of matching conversation partners. The
event that more than one sessional protocol ΠtB,A engaging matching conversations
with ΠsA,B is called the event of multiple match, denoted by Multiple−MatchO(k).
[BR93B] showed that if two parties are mutually authenticated, then event
Multiple−MatchO(k) should not happen.
Session Key Indistinguishability and Key Exchange
In [BCK98], Bellare and Rogaway treated the problem of authenticated key ex-
change as two sub-problems: mutual authentication and key exchange. After look-
ing at the mutual authentication problem, the security of key exchange is treated
with the concept of indistinguishability of session keys. Basically, Bellare and Ro-
gaway suggested that the key exchange component of an AKE protocol should be
in charge of protecting the session key information being leaked. The way to de-
termine this is by asking if the adversary can distinguish the session key from any
other random key.
As explained before, a secure key exchange process should prohibit the adversary
knowing the session key with probability higher than guessing. However, if the
adversary is able to perform reveal queries, obviously it can retrieve any session key
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by just offering reveal. Therefore, the target of attack should be restricted such that
the adversary cannot perform reveal on it. Bellare and Rogaway set the restriction
as the following:
A sessional protocol Πsi,j is called fresh if (1) it accepts, (2) it is unopened, and
(3) there is no open sessional protocol Πtj,i engaging a matching conversation with
Πsi,j. If Π
s
i,j is fresh, then the corresponding session key sk
s
i,j is also said to be fresh.
Condition (1) captures the idea that there is no point for an adversary to ask
a sessional protocol for its session key when it does not even accept. Condition (2)
says that if the adversary is trying to attack a sessional protocol for which it already
issued a reveal query, then it already has the session key and does not need to ask
for it again. Condition (3) says that if the adversary knows the session key of the
sessional protocol Πtj,i, which has developed a session key with Π
s
i,j, then attacking
Πsi,j will be trivial, too. Therefore, the above three cases cannot be considered as
targets of the adversary’s attack. This implies the condition on issuing the test
query and definition of another event, Good− GuessO(k):
Suppose the protocol is run; the adversary performs several send and reveal
queries, then at the end it issues the test query to a sessional protocol, say Πsi,j.
Πsi,j must satisfy the above three conditions, and then the adversary is allowed to
attack it.
After the test query has been sent, the issued protocol Πsi,j performs the following
steps:
1. a random bit b ∈R {0, 1} is generated.
2. if b = 0 then the session key sksi,j is returned to the adversary.
3. Otherwise, a random value from the key space is returned to the adversary.
Seeing the returned string, the adversary must reply what the value b (which is
not revealed to it) is. If the adversary successfully guesses the random bit b, it is
referred to as the Good− GuessO(k) event, with the presence of adversary O and
security parameter k.
The concept of security is then defined as follows: the adversary should not be
able to compute in polynomial time any information about the session key, and
thus should not be able to tell the difference between the session key and any other
random key from the key space.
Note that in pure guessing, the adversary is still able to get the value of b
with probability of 1/2. So if the adversary does better than guessing, it has some




0, Pr[Good− GuessO(k)]− 1
2
}
So the formal definition of a secure authenticated key exchange protocols is as
follows:
Definition: A message-driven protocol Π is a secure message authentication
protocol if
1. Π is a secure mutual authentication protocol.
2. If O is a benign adversary and Πsi,j and Π
t
j,i are two sessional protocols O runs
experiments on, then both Πsi,j and Π
t





3. advO(k) is negligible.
It can be easily seen that condition (3) is ensuring that the adversary cannot
distinguish the session key with any other random string from the key space. Con-
dition (2) ensures that the keys are distributed (in this case exchanged) properly if
both parties of the protocol are honest and the adversary is a passive attacker.
4.4.4 Summary of the Model and Comments
[BR93B] was the first to realize the importance of formalizing notions of key dis-
tribution and key exchange. In order to define security of mutual authentication
and key exchange, the concepts of matching conversation and indistinguishability
of session keys were introduced, which greatly impacted the direction of defining
security notions in the later work. In the definition of mutual authentication, the
concept of matching intended participants was introduced.
[BR93B] informally described a design methodology to secure authenticated
key exchange, but the proposed protocols in the paper are in the secret-key setting
with the intended purpose of (possibly, group) key distribution, which is really an
authenticated key transport protocol in today’s terminology. However, the idea
of taking a secure mutual authentication protocol and converting it into a secure
authenticated key exchange can be adapted to other settings.
Although the model is intended for an extension to multiple-party key distribu-
tion, the paper discusses the case of two entities only, and if the setting has changed
to just key establishment between any two entities of a large group, then obviously
each pair of user’s secret key should be different from another pair. In this case,
the model may need to be modified to better reflect the real-life scenario.
33
4.5 The Blake-Wilson-Menezes Model
After the work by Bellare and Rogaway in [BR93B] and [BR93A], in 1997 Blake-
Wilson and Menezes adapted the model in [BR93B] and established another model
for authentication and authenticated key transport in the asymmetric setting. An-
other paper, published by Blake-Wilson, Johnson, and Menezes ([BWJM97]), dis-
cusses authenticated key exchange in the asymmetric setting. The model used in
[BWJM97], though, is directly from [BWM97]. Therefore, the concepts used to
describe the model are from [BWM97], but the relevant security definitions of au-
thenticated key exchange come from both papers. Discussions and comments on
the two papers will be given at appropriate places throughout this section.
Having viewed the above model, it will be easier to explain this model; some of
the settings and assumptions are identical to the previous model, and the link from
real-life scenario to formalization should be more understandable to the reader.
Another significance of this paper is that some of the assumptions specified in this
model are used as standard assumptions in the rest of this thesis. Therefore, it is
worthwhile to discuss this model in detail, and then readers can understand the
modelling in an easier way.
The organization of this subsection is as follows: the link connecting real life
situations to formalization is omitted since most of the connections are described in
the previous model, except for minor changes. Therefore, when there is a difference
in modelling real life situations, explanations will be given. Otherwise, it is assumed
that readers are familiar with the link between reality and formalization from the
previous section. First, the formal model will be described, then the definition of a
secure protocol is given. This section ends with some comments about this model,
including some comparisons with the Bellare and Rogaway model.
4.5.1 The Formal Model
Preliminaries
• The setting is asymmetric; each user owns a public-private key pair for en-
cryption, and another pair for signatures. This contrasts with the symmetric
setting in the Bellare and Rogaway model, where each pair of users share a
secret beforehand. It is also assumed in this model that keys and certificates
of each user are generated and distributed before the protocol starts.
• Unlike the Bellare and Rogaway model, Blake-Wilson and Menezes focus
specifically on key transport from one user to another, instead of a more
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general key distribution between potentially many users. [BWJM97] focuses
on key exchange in the asymmetric setting.
• The security parameter is denoted by a natural number k.
• {0, 1}∗ denotes the set of finite binary strings (same as in the previous model).
• λ denotes the empty string.
• The set of users I is defined as {1, 2, . . . , N1}. The adversary O is not included
in I . The size of I is constrained to be polynomial in k.
• A real-valued function ε(k) is negligible if for all constants c > 0, ∃ a kc > 0
such that ε(k) < k−c for all k > kc.
• A protocol is defined to be a pair P = (Π,G) of probabilistic polynomial-time
computable functions.
• The long term keys are now defined in the public key setting. Each user has
a public/private key pair for encryption, and another pair for signatures.
• The benign adversary is informally defined as an adversary that only (faith-
fully) relays messages in the protocol. It is sometimes also referred to as the
passive attacker.
Running the Protocol
The usual meaning of a protocol run means a generic execution of a protocol be-
tween two users. However such a term in the model will be referred to as a session.
Running the protocol will mean execution of the formal model, or sometimes re-
ferred to as the experiment done by the adversary.
The long-term key generator G in the Blake-Wilson and Menezes model gen-
erates key-pairs in the public-key setting. It uses two additional algorithms, Genc
to generate encryption key pairs, and Gsig to generate signature key pairs. The
public/private key pair for encryption is denoted as (PEK,SEK), and the pub-
lic/private key pair for signature is denoted as (PSK, SSK).
At the beginning of running the protocol, G takes a security parameter 1k and
a random input. It generates the (PEK,SEK) and (PSK, SSK) key pairs for
each user, and distributes the keys to each user securely. (That is, the total keying
information for each user i, denoted by Ki is equal to ((pski, sski), (peki, seki))).
The key generator also generates keys for the adversary. G also publishes a directory
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called public-info. This directory contains triples of user i’s public information
PKi = (i, PEKi, PSKi), where PEKi is i’s public encryption key, and PSKi is i’s
public signing key. Note that each Genc and Gsig also may or may not need random
numbers as input.
Π specifies the behaviour of each honest user of the protocol. Π takes the inputs
(1k, i, j, Ki,j, κ), where
• 1k is the security parameter.
• i, j ∈ I represent the identity of the sender and the intended responder.
• Ki,j is i’s keying information (meaning the key pairs (PEKi, SEKi) and
(PSKi, SSKi), denoted by Ki) together with j’s public keying information
PKj = (j, PEKj, PSKj).
• κ is the record of the ordered messages sent and received by i so far in the
protocol.
The output of Π(1k, i, j, Ki,j, κ) is a triple ((m, a), δ, sk), where
• m ∈ {0, 1}∗ ∪ {∗} is the message to be sent from i to j
• a is the appendix of m. In the Blake-Wilson and Menezes model it specifically
represents the signature on m.
• δ takes on three values: A as in accept, R as in reject, and the empty output
∗ as in undecided. It represents i’s current decision.
• sk is the value of the exchanged key. It holds the value null before i accepts
and will not be used in (entity) authentication-only protocols. (Note that the
null value in the Bellare and Rogaway model is specified as ∗.)
Let Π(m,a),δ denote the first two components of the output, and let Πsk denote the
third. That is, Π(m,a),δ(1k, i, j,Ki,j, κ) = ((m, a), δ), and Π
sk(1k, i, j,Ki,j, κ) = sk.
The sessional protocols are denoted by Πsi,j, where i, j ∈ I , and s ∈ N. This no-
tation represents entity i conducting a protocol run (or a session) to entity j for the
sth time. Note that in Bellare and Rogaway’s model, the value s is merely a natural
number representing a session ID. However, s in Blake-Wilson and Menezes’s model
actually serves also as a counter of the number of times i believes it has talked to
j. Each sessional protocol is associated with a record of conversation, denoted by
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κsi,j for the sessional protocol Π
s
i,j. At the start of the protocol run, each oracle Π
s
i,j
is initialized with the security parameter 1k and the keying information of user i
(namely ki), the conversation log κ
s
i,j, and the public-info directory. In which, the
conversation log at the initialization phase is set to be the empty string λ.
The adversary is denoted by the name Oscar, and symbolized as O. It is mod-
elled to have control of all communications, and it can reveal one or more particular
session keys, reveal long-term private keys, and can ask different sessions to start
at will. To formalize, the adversary is able to send four types of queries:
• The Send Query: this query is almost the same as the send query in the
Bellare and Rogaway model. This query models the adversary sending a
message to i pretending to be j, and it receives a reply from i. The query
takes inputs Πsi,j and (m
′, a′)) for some messages m′ and secret information
a′, and it returns Π(m,a),δ(1k, i, j, sk ij, κ||(m′, a′)), and updates κ to become
κ||(m′, a′)||(m, a).
• The Reveal Query: this type of queries asks a user to reveal its session
key modelled by oracle Πsi,j. This type of query models the known-session
key attack. The format of the query is of the form Reveal(Πsi,j) and it returns
Πk(1k, i, j, sk ij, κ). No oracle updates take place.
• The Corrupt Query: the query Corrupt tends to model two real-life sce-
narios: 1) the adversary O completely takes over the identity of a user i 6= O,
replacing i’s private and public keys with the adversary’s own choices, 2) the
adversary may register a new public key for i without knowing i’s private key.
Also, after the adversary sends this query, he retrieves the value of i’s keying
information, ki. Formally speaking, the Corrupt query takes two inputs i and
K, and the oracle replies with ki, user i’s keying information, and the oracle
updates ki to become K. In case of the adversary only replacing a user’s
public keying information, the user’s private keying information becomes the
empty string λ.
• The Test Query: it is the challenge the adversary faces at the end of its
control over the communication. It must decide the secret bit generated by
the sessional protocol that it attacks.
The number of sessional protocols being controlled by the adversary is limited
to a polynomial in the security parameter k. As a comparison, the Bellare and Rog-
away’s model allows the adversary to have control over as many sessional protocols
as possible.
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Running the protocol P with the presence of the adversary O and security
parameter k takes the following steps:
1. Generate random inputs for G, Genc, Gsig, the adversary O, and each sessional
protocol Πsi,j.
2. Run G with the security parameter 1k and the random input to generate
public/private key pairs (of encryption and signature schemes) for each entity
i ∈ I and the adversary. G also distributes the key pairs securely. That is,
a user’s private keying information is not exposed to the adversary. Then
G compiles the public directory public-info and publishes it. Note that this
type of setting only works in the scenario where all users must have certified
and published their certificates and keying information before the protocol
starts; registering certificates/keying information during a protocol run (or a
session) is not allowed. Comparitively, in real life certificates are exchanged
only when a session starts, a user i does not know j’s certificate nor public
keying information until it first communicates with it. The inclusion of public-
info means that everyone knows each other’s public keying information to
start with, which is unrealistic.
3. Initialize each sessional protocol Πsi,j. Note again that the number of sessional
protocols is polynomial in the security parameter k.
4. Start the adversary O on the security parameter 1k, the random input, and
the public directory public-info.
5. O starts its experiment at will. That is, it sends queries (either Send, Reveal,
or Corrupt) to sessional protocols. In other words, the adversary can at any
time ask a user i to reveal its session key sk ij with user j, can ask a user i to
reveal its long-term keying information Ki and replace i’s long-term keying
information.
6. After sending queries for a while, the adversary issues the test query to a
sessional protocol that is fresh. (For definition of freshness and more on the
Test query, please see below.) If the adversary successfully passes the Test
query, then it succeeds; otherwise it fails.
4.5.2 Definition of a Secure Protocol
This subsection discusses the definition of a secure authenticated key exchange
protocol only. However, some relevant side security issues, such as the security of a
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signature scheme, are widely applied in authenticated key exchange protocols but
not discussed in [BWJM97] (instead they are discussed in [BWM97]). Therefore,
the security definition of signature schemes from [BWM97] and the security of MAC
from [BWJM97] are discussed.
Similar to Bellare and Rogaway’s model, Blake-Wilson and Menezes’ model
looks at the security of authenticated key exchange in two separate steps: (mutual
entity) authentication and key exchange. The security of authentication is based
on matching conversations, and the security of key exchange is based on session
key indistinguishability.
Before going further, some terminology should be introduced.
• If there has been a Corrupt(i, ·) query,then Πsi,j is said to be corrupted, for all
i, j ∈ I , s ∈ N.
• If there there has been a Reveal(Πsi,j) query, then Πsi,j is said to be opened for
all i, j, s.
• Πsi,j is said to have been accepted if Πδ(1k, i, j, sk ij, κsi,j) = A.
Security of Signature Schemes and MACs
Signature schemes and MACs are mostly used for data integrity and authentication.
These two cryptographic tools are also widely used in designing authenticated key
exchange protocols in the asymmetric setting. Therefore, it is crucial to take the
security of signature schemes and MACs into consideration when developing the
formal model.
The security of a signature scheme considered in Blake-Wilson and Menezes’s
model is inherited from the definition by Goldwasser, Micali, and Rivest ([GMR88]).
This definition will hereafter being referred to as the GMR-security. Similarly, if a
protocol is said to be GMR-secure, it satisfies the definition of security in [GMR88].
Formally (the definition is from [GMR88]), a signature scheme is a triple
(Gsig, [·]sig(·), [·, ·]ver(·))
of polynomial-time algorithms. On input 1k, Gsig generates a key pair (PSK, SSK).
To sign a message m, the entity with key pair (PSK, SSK) computes :
(m,σ) ← [m]sig(SSK)
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where σ is called the signature of m, and (m,σ) is called a signed message. To
verify the validity of message m, one computes:
[m,σ]ver(PSK) ∈ {true, false}
where the condition below must hold:
[m,σ]ver(PSK) = true ∀ (m,σ) ∈ {[m]sig(SSK)}.
The adversary Osig of the signature scheme is defined as a probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithm with access to a signature oracle. Osig takes the input of some public
signing key PSK, chosen by Gsig, and outputs a pair (m,σ) where Osig did not query
the signing oracle on m. [GMR88] asserts that a signature scheme is secure if the
probability of the adversary forging a signature on a new message is negligible. For-
mally, the definition of signature scheme’s security (again from [GMR88]) is given
by:
Definition: a signature scheme is secure if, for every adversary Osig (of the
signature scheme), the function ε(k) defined by
ε(k) = Pr[(PSK, SSK) ← Gsig(1k)|(m, σ) ← Osig(PSK) : [m,σ]ver(PSK) = true]
is negligible.
Note that in the definition above, the adversary can take a given message m, ask
the signing oracle to give it a signed message (m,σ), and then compute σ′ such that
σ′ is also the signature of m. This would cause incompatibility with the original
definition of matching conversations.
The security of a MAC is based on [BRK96] by Bellare, Canetti, and Krawczyk.
For the rest of this thesis, the security of MACs will be based on the definition in
[BRK96].
Definition: (from [BRK96]) A message authentication code is a deterministic
polynomial-time algorithm MAC(·)(·). To authenticate a message m, an entity with
key K computes
(m, a) = MACK(m)
Here a is called the tag on message m, and (m, a) is called an authenticated message.
To verify the validity of message m, any entity with the key K can check that
MACK(m) is indeed equal to (m, a).
The adversary OMAC (of a MAC) is defined as a polynomial-time probabilistic
algorithm which has access to an oracle that computes MACs under a randomly
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chosen but fixed key K. The output of OMAC is a pair (m, a) such that OMAC did
not query m to the MAC oracle.
The security of a MAC, informally, is defined such that the probability of OMAC
forging a valid tag on any message that has not yet been authenticated using a call
to the MAC oracle is negligible. This is referred to as a chosen-message attack.
The formal definition is given as follows:
Definition: (from [BRK96]) The MAC algorithm is secure if, for every adver-
sary OMAC of the MAC, the function ε(k), defined by
ε(k) = Pr[K ← {0, 1}k; (m, a) ← OMAC |(m, a) = MACK(m)]
is negligible.
Matching Conversation and (Entity) Authentication
Similar to Bellare and Rogaway’s model, [BWM97] and [BWJM97] both define
mutual authentication using the concept of matching conversations. However, the
matching conversation described in [BWM97] is slightly modified due to the in-
compatibility of the GMR-security of signature schemes and the original definition
of matching conversation. The definition of a secure MAC, however, is compatible
with the original definition of matching conversations, and hence it was not changed
in [BWJM97].
Recall that with the GMR definition of secure signature schemes, the adversary
can take a given message m, ask the signing oracle to give it a signed message (m,σ),
and then (perhaps) compute σ′ such that σ′ is also the signature of m. [BWM97]
explained that such an ability causes the incompatibility of the standard definition
of matching conversation and security of signature schemes, but the reason for why
this is the case is still unknown up to this point.
For the description of the original definition of matching conversation, please
refer to the previous model. The modified matching conversation is described as
follows:
The record of conversation of a particular sessional protocol Πsi,j should take the
form of
κsi,j = (t1, (m1, a1), (µ1, α1))||
(t2, (m2, a2), (µ2, α2))|| . . .
(tw, (mw, aw), (µw, αw))
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where tl denotes the time the sessional protocol receives the query, (ml, al) is the
input message and signature of the message input to Πsi,j at time tl. (µl, αl) is the
output message and signature of the message from Πsi,j. If (m1, a1) = λ then Π
s
i,j is
referred to as the initiator ; otherwise it is referred to as the responder.
Definition: (from [BWM97]) Without loss of generality, assume the number
of flows of a protocol, R, is odd. Protocol P = (Π,G) is run with adversary O.
Consider an initiator sessional protocol Πsi,j and a responder sessional oracle Π
t
j,i
that O experiments on. Let the corresponding record of conversation be denoted
as κsi,j and κ
t
j,i, respectively.
1. κtj,i is said to be a matching conversation to κ
s
i,j if there exists t0 < t1 < . . . <
tR−1 such that κsi,j is prefixed by
(t0, λ, (m1, a1))||(t2, (µ1, α′1), (m2, a2))|| . . . ||(t2ρ−2, (µρ−1, α′ρ−1), (mρ, aρ))
and κtj,i is prefixed by
(t1, (m1, a
′
1), (µ1, α1))||(t3, (m2, a′2), (µ2, α2))|| . . . ||
(t2ρ−3, (mρ−1, a′ρ−1), (µρ−1, αρ−1)).
κtj,i is said to be a matching conversation including appendices to κ
s
i,j if addi-
tionally a1 = a
′
1, . . . , aρ−1 = a
′
ρ−1 and α1 = α
′
1, . . . , αρ−1 = α
′
ρ−1.
2. κsi,j is said to be a matching conversation to κ
t
j,i if there exists t0 < t1 < . . . <
tR−1 such that κtj,i is prefixed by
(t1, (m1, a
′
1), (µ1, α1))||(t3, (m2, a′2), (µ2, α2))|| . . .
||(t2ρ−3, (mρ−1, a′ρ−1), (µρ−1, αρ−1))||(t2ρ−1, (mρ, a′ρ), ∗)
and κsi,j is prefixed by
(t0, λ, (m1, a1))||(t2, (µ1, α′1), (m2, a2))|| . . . ||(t2ρ−2, (µρ−1, α′ρ−1), (mρ, aρ)).
κsi,j is said to be a matching conversation including appendices to κ
t
j,i if addi-
tionally a1 = a
′
1, . . . , aρ−1 = a
′
ρ−1 and α1 = α
′
1, . . . , αρ−1 = α
′
ρ−1.
The above definition is referred to as matching conversation including appen-
dices. The concept is that a matching conversation in the asymmetric setting
should not just have the adversary faithfully delivering the messages, but also the
appendices (such as signatures) between the two sessional protocols.
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Let No−MatchO(k) denote the event that when protocol P is run against ad-
versary O with security parameter k, there is an uncorrupted sessional protocol Πsi,j
which accepts, but there is no corresponding sessional protocol Πtj,i which engages
in a matching conversation to Πsi,j.
Definition: (from [BWM97]) A protocol P is a secure mutual authentication
protocol if for all adversary O:
1. If two sessional protocols Πsi,j and Π
t
j,i have a matching conversation including
appendices, then both sessional protocols accept.
2. The probability of event No−MatchingO(k) is negligible.
In [BWJM97], no such definition is given regarding the security of mutual au-
thentication. In fact, in the two types of authenticated key agreement protocols
(authenticated key exchange and authenticated key exchange with key confirma-
tion), the term mutual (entity) authentication is not explicitly mentioned and does
not appear in both protocols’ definition of security. However, mutual entity au-
thentication is an important part of the definition of a secure authenticated key
transport protocol in [BWM97], and the concept of matching definition including
appendices is crucial with the security of signature schemes. Thus it is very impor-
tant to mention the concepts of matching conversation including appendices and
mutual authentication (including appendices) in this subsection.
Secure Authenticated Key Exchange and Secure Authenticated Key Ex-
change with Key Confirmation
The two types of authenticated key exchange protocols mentioned in [BWJM97]
are authenticated key exchange with implicit key authentication (denoted as an
AKI protocol) and authenticated key exchange with explicit key authentication or
key confirmation (denoted as an AKC protocol). Part of the notion of security in
an AKI or AKC protocol is adversary’s incapability of distinguishing the session
key with any random key from the key space (session key indistinguishability).
Because of the necessity of using appendices in the asymmetric setting and the
different notion of matching conversations, we use the term matching conversation
and No−MatchingO(k) in a context-free manner: whenever a signature is used as
appendices, then the definition of matching conversation including appendices and
the corresponding No−Matching event should be used. Otherwise, the “standard”
notion of matching conversation and No−Matching should be used.
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One assumption in treating the security of authenticated key exchange protocols
is that no session key will be computed by a sessional protocol unless it has accepted.
Note that the event No−MatchingO(k) is defined the same way as in [BR93B].
A sessional protocol Πsi,j is said to be fresh if (1) both i and j are not corrupted,
(2) Πsi,j is unopened, (3) it has accepted, and (4) there is no opened sessional
protocol Πtj,i engaging in a matching conversation with Π
s
i,j. As well, if a sessional
protocol is fresh, then its corresponding session key is fresh, too.
The test query and the event Good− GuessO(k) is defined exactly the same as
in [BWM97]. That is, at the end of the adversary’s experiment, it calls the test
query on some fresh sessional oracle Πsi,j. The sessional protocol ‘tosses a coin’ and
gets a random bit b ∈ {0, 1}. If b = 0 then Πsi,j returns its session key sksi,j to the
adversary; it returns a random key from the key space, otherwise. The adversary
now must guess what the bit b is. If O successfully guesses the random bit, then







which is equivalent to the definition in [BR93B].
The formal definition of AKI and AKC are described below:
Definition: (from [BWJM97]) A protocol P = (Π,G) is a secure AKC protocol
if
1. If O is a benign adversary on Πsi,j and Π
t
j,i, then both sessional protocols accept
with the same session key sk, and the key is uniformly randomly distributed
over {0, 1}k.
2. For all adversaries O, if uncorrupted sessional protocols Πsi,j and Π
t
j,i have a
matching conversation, then both protocols accept and hold the same session
key sk.
3. The probability of No−MatchingO(k) is negligible.
4. advO(k) is negligible.
Condition (1) asserts that a passive attacker cannot have any impact on the
security of the protocol. Condition (2) says that if both parties are honest and the
transmissions between them are not altered, then both of them should accept and
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share the same session key. The third condition says that the adversary cannot make
any sessional oracle to accept once it alters the transmitted message. [BWJM97]
interprets this condition as ‘essentially the only way for any adversary to get an
uncorrupted entity to accept in a run of the protocol with any other uncorrupted
entity is by relaying communications like a wire’. However, we believe that condition
(3) also serves the concept of matching intended participants. That is, if i’s intended
participant is j in a protocol run, then the security of this protocol will ensure that
j is aware that it is engaged in a this particular protocol run with i. The negligible
probability of No−Matching says that for all sessional protocols Πsi,j that accept,
there exists a corresponding sessional protocol Πtj,i that engages in a matching
conversation with it. That is, if i believes that it has involved in a communication
with entity j and reaches the conclusion that they share a key sk (i has accepted),
then j must be convinced that it is also involved in this protocol run with i and
shares the same session key sk. However, the interpretation of [BWJM97] does not
seem to suggest this idea.
Definition: (from [BWJM97]) A protocol P is a secure AKI protocol if
1. If O is a benign adversary on Πsi,j and Π
t
j,i, then both sessional protocols accept
with the same developed session key sk, and the key is uniformly randomly
distributed over {0, 1}k.
2. For all adversaries O, if uncorrupted sessional protocols Πsi,j and Π
t
j,i have a
matching conversation, then both protocols accept and hold the same session
key sk.
3. The probability of advO(k) is negligible.
Note that the difference between an AKI protocol and an AKC protocol is that
a secure AKC protocol requires the event No−Matching to have negligible proba-
bility, but AKI does not. At a glance of [BWJM97], the definition of a secure AKI
seems to be inadequate since one would hope to have negligible No−Matching prob-
ability for any secure authenticated key exchange protocol. After consulting with
the author of [BWJM97], it was clarified that the definition of AKC was the pro-
posed definition of a secure AK protocol. Therefore, the authors of [BWJM97] also
agreed that the negligible No−Matching probability property should be preserved
in the definition of a secure AKE (authenticated key exchange) protocol.
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4.6 The Bellare-Canetti-Krawczyk’s Modulariza-
tion Model
In 1998, Bellare, Canetti, and Krawczyk ([BCK98]) introduced a different design
methodology of authenticated key exchange protocols. Their model not only sup-
ports key exchange, but more general authentication and authenticated key estab-
lishment protocols. As a result, a new model was needed to provide the proof of
security of their proposed protocol. They further extended the model in [CK01]
to show other applications in other fields of cryptography, but this section mainly
focuses on the basic model and the relevant issues regarding authenticated key
exchange.
The model was developed with the specific intention of solving authenticated key
exchange. The approach is to first design a key exchange protocol Π that is secure
in an ideal, authenticated setting, prove its security, then transfer this protocol
Π into a secure authenticated key exchange protocol Π′ in the unauthenticated
setting using an authenticator. The authenticator also ensures that the protocol
Π in the authenticated setting has an equivalent behaviour as protocol Π′ in the
unauthenticated protocol.
Having this concept in mind, their formalization involves two models: the first
one is an Authenticated-links Model (AM) and the second one an Unauthenticated-
links Model (UM).
4.6.1 The Authenticated-Links Model (AM)
The user set I contains n users 1, 2, . . . , n, each running a copy of a protocol Π
(where Π is defined as being controlled by the adversary and it only responds when
the adversary sends a query to it). Π is called a message driven protocol. The
adversary in this model, for ease of recognition, is denoted by OAM. Similar to
the previous model, the communication between each party is modelled as follows:
the adversary asks a sessional protocol of the sender i Πsi,j to initiate a protocol
run (this is referred to as an external request) or sending a message to a sessional
protocol Πsi,j for response (this is referred to as an activation upon input message
m). The adversary can see any public response returned by a protocol, but not
the internal state change of the protocol. In the AM model, OAM is restricted to
delivering messages faithfully (that is, being a passive attacker). This restriction is
modelled by having a temporary set of undelivered messages M . Whenever OAM
sends an external requests to a sessional protocol Πsi,j, the output message m and
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the intended recipient j are included in the set M . When OAM sends a query
(activates) a sessional protocol Πs
′
j,i on an input message m, m must be in set M
and m’s associated intended recipient must be j. However, the adversary is not
required to maintain the order of messages being sent; it can send unlimited number
of external requests (therefore he controls an unlimited number of such Πsi,js); it is
not required to maintain any fairness of activating protocols; and it is not required
to deliver all messages. On top of that, the adversary can also send Corrupt queries
to a user. Once a user i is corrupted, all the internal state information (including
its long-lived keying information) is known to OAM. The adversary can also include
any message m in the set M as long as the sender is specified as the corrupted
party i. From the time that i is corrupted, any messages returned by Πsi,j will have
a special tag specifying i has been corrupted.
The output observed by the adversary, together with its random output, is called
the adversarial view. The concatenation of all cumulative outputs of all sessional
protocols and the adversary view is called the global output. Let ADVΠ,OAM(
−→x ,−→r )
denote the adversary view of adversary OAM interacting with users running proto-
col Π on input −→x = (x1x2 . . . xn) and random input −→r = (r0r1r2 . . . rn) (r0 is the
random input in starting the adversary, and xi, ri are the input and random input
to start-up the sessional protocols associated with user i). Let AUTHΠ,OAM(
−→x ,−→r )i
denote the output of user i, running Π on input −→x and random input −→r , and
with adversary OAM. Let AUTHΠ,OAM(
−→x ,−→r ) denote the global output, that is,
AUTHΠ,OAM(
−→x ,−→r ) = ADVΠ,OAM(−→x ,−→r )||AUTHΠ,OAM(−→x ,−→r )1||
AUTHΠ,OAM(
−→x ,−→r )2|| . . . ||AUTHΠ,OAM(−→x ,−→r )n. Let AUTHΠ,OAM(−→x ) denote the
random variable describing AUTHΠ,OAM(
−→x ,−→r ) when −→r is uniformly chosen.
4.6.2 The Unauthenticated-Links Model (UM)
The computation model of the unauthenticated-links model is similar, except the
power of the adversary has been strengthened. To distinguish the two types of
adversaries, let OUM denote the adversary in the unauthenticated-links model. Also,
if we wish to address the name of the adversaries, OAM will be called AM-Oscar and
OUM will be addressed as UM-Oscar. Unlike AM-Oscar, UM-Oscar can now send
queries to any sessional protocol with any arbitrary message m, not just limited to
messages in the undelivered message set.
The protocol is augmented by an initialization function G that generates and
distributes public-key information and private keys for each entity i. Formally, G
takes a random input r and outputs a vector G(r) = G(r)0G(r)1 . . .G(r)n, where
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G(r)0 is the public key information and known to all entities (including the adver-
sary). G(r)i is the private key information of entity i, and this piece of information
is distributed in a secure way that only i knows the value and no one else does.
Another two notations, UNAUTHΠ,OUM(
−→x ,−→r ) and UNAUTHΠ,OUM(−→x ) are de-
fined similarly to AUTHΠ,OAM(
−→x ,−→r ) and AUTHΠ,OAM(−→x )
4.6.3 Emulation
The key point of Bellare, Canetti, and Krawczyk’s model is the authenticators
that transform a protocol Π in the ideal, authenticated setting into an equivalent
protocol Π′ in the realistic, unauthenticated model. By “equivalent”, [BCK98]
informally states it should mean “running Π′ in an unauthenticated network has
the same effect as running Π in an authenticated network”. More formally, we have
the following defintition:
DEFINITION: Let Π and Π′ both be message-driven protocols. The proto-
col Π′ in the unauthenticated network emulates Π in the authenticated network if
for every UM-adversary OUM, there exists an AM-adversary OAM such that for all
inputs −→x ,
AUTHΠ,OAM(
−→x ) ≈c UNAUTHΠ,OUM(−→x )
where ≈c denotes “computationally indistinguishable”.
That is, if Π′ emulates Π, then the combined distribution of the adversary
and all the parties, and the identity of corrupted users on all input −→x , should be
indistinguishable for Π′ and Π.
4.6.4 Authenticators and MT-Authenticators
An authenticator in [BCK98] is defined as an algorithm that takes as input the
description of a protocol Π in the authenticated setting, and outputs the description
of another protocol Π′, in which Π′ emulates Π in the unauthenticated setting.
In other words, an authenticator can take a protocol secure in the authenticated
setting, then translates it into a secure protocol (equivalent to the first one) in the
unauthenticated setting.
The construction of authenticators is through a layered, two-step process. First
a simpler protocol called the MT-authenticator is introduced. Its only purpose is
48
to deliver messages from one entity to another in an authenticated manner (in an
unauthenticated network). Then the second step is to construct an authenticator
based on the MT-authenticator. The MT-authenticator is described as follows:
Define the MT-protocol MT in the following way. The protocol takes empty
input. Upon an external request to entity i, of the form (j, m), i sends the message
(i, j, m) to user j, and outputs the message ‘i sent m to j’. Upon receiving message
(i, j, m), j outputs ‘j received m from i’. The MT-authenticator mt is a protocol
that emulates MT in unauthenticated settings.
An authenticator can be constructed from an MT-authenticator mt. Let Cmt be
an algorithm described as follows: Given a protocol Π in the authenticated network,
apply Cmt to Π to get Π
′ = Cmt(Π); Π′ invokes mt. Whenever a message is to be
sent in Π, Π′ sends an external request to mt, asking to send the same message to
the specified recipient. Whenever a message is received in protocol Π′, it activates
mt with this incoming message. After mt outputs ‘i received m from j’ for the
incoming message m, Π is activated with incoming messages m from user j. In
[BCK98] Cmt is proven to be an authenticator; that simplifies the task of creating
an authenticator to creating a protocol that serves a narrower purpose, namely the
MT-authenticator. The readers can refer to [BCK98] for the proof.
4.6.5 The Ideal Key Exchange Process
In [BCK98], the secure key exchange protocols are defined through a formal model
as well. Basically, the adversary’s power is limited to a certain extent that is the
best we can expect from a key exchange protocol. Then any key exchange protocol
which can emulate the ideal key exchange process is said to be secure.
Informally, the model consists of multi-users, each may have multiple key ex-
change sessions with another entity. The adversary is limited so that the exposure of
one session key between two users should not allow the adversary to gain knowledge
of any other session keys and long-term keys.
Formally, the user set I consists of n users {1, 2, . . . , n}, the adversary in the
ideal key exchange setting is referred to as the ideal-KE-adversary (also known as
ideal-KE-Oscar or OIDEAL−KE). There is also a trusted party T that distributes
or generates information securely without letting the adversary know the values
of distribution. Again the communication is controlled by the adversary, and the
adversary now has four types of queries:
1. Invoke i (as an initiator) to exchange a new key with j: the effect
of this query is that the output of i is concatenated with a new value ‘i
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established key (sk, s) with j’, where sk is the new session key chosen via some
predetermined distribution, s is the session ID, in the format of (i, j, c, init),
indicating that it is the cth time i establishes a key with j, and the value init
indicates that i is the initiator. The adversary is able to learn the value of s
but not sk, and the value s is added to the global set of incomplete sessions
(denoted by IS).
2. Invoke j (the responder) to exchange a key of session s with i: the
adversary is only allowed to send this query if s is in IS and s is of the
form (i, j, c, init) for some initiator i and numerical value c. The effect of
this query is that: 1) the value ‘j has exchanged key (sk, s′) with i’, where
sk is the established key and s′ is of the form (i, j, c, resp). resp indicate j
is the responder of the protocol, and the other values of s′ must match the
corresponding values in s. Here j is thought to receive the value sk securely
by an trusted party, which does not reveal the value of sk to the adversary.
Also the value s is deleted from the set of incomplete sessions IS.
3. Corrupt session s: let s be of the form (i, j, c, init) with the corresponding
s′ = (i, j, c, resp) and suppose the the exchanged key is sk. Session s can
only be corrupted if s is currently in IS or was but not now in IS. If s is
currently in IS, then the value ’s is corrupted’ is appended to the output
of the initiator, and s is not deleted from IS. If s is no longer in IS, then
both ‘s is corrupted’ and ’s′ is corrupted’ are appended to the output of the
initiator. The adversary also learns the value of sk.
4. Corrupt party i: the effect of this query is that all key values known to
user i is now known to the adversary, and the value ‘i is corrupted’ is added
to i’s output.
Let the notation ADVOIDEAL−KE(rOIDEAL−KE , rT ) represent the output of the adver-
sary OIDEAL−KE of a run on random input rOscarIDEAL−KE and the keys are chosen by
T using random input rT . Similarly, let IDEALOIDEAL−KE(rOIDEAL−KE , rT )i denote the
output of user i on inputs rOscarIDEAL−KE and rT . Let IDEALOIDEAL−KE(rOIDEAL−KE , rT )
denote the concatenation of the adversary’s view and all other user’s view. That
is,
IDEALOIDEAL−KE(rOIDEAL−KE , rT ) = ADVOIDEAL−KE(rOIDEAL−KE , rT )||
IDEALOIDEAL−KE(rOIDEAL−KE , rT )1||
IDEALOIDEAL−KE(rOIDEAL−KE , rT )2|| . . . ||
IDEALOIDEAL−KE(rOIDEAL−KE , rT )n
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Also, let IDEALOIDEAL() denote the random variable describing IDEALOIDEAL(rOIDEAL , rT )
when rOIDEAL and rT are uniformly chosen.
4.6.6 How to Prove the Security of a Key Exchange Pro-
tocol
Unlike [BR93B] and [KM04]’s main focus on formal modelling, [BCK98] was writ-
ten with the purpose of designing a secure protocol, and thus the way of proving
security is slightly different from the other two. In particular, [BR93B] and [KM04]
define security in terms of the probability of the adversary knowing the exchanged
session key, and the probability of a mismatched conversation (see the previous
sections). In [BCK98], the security of a key exchange protocol is represented as
what the adversary can do under a secure situation. Then given the protocol in the
authenticated and unauthenticated links model, we try to prove the adversary in
both models cannot do better than the adversary in the secure situation. Formally,
[BCK98] gives the following definition:
1. Secure in the AM-Model: If Π is a message driven key exchange protocol
for n parties, then Π is a secure key exchange protocol in the authenticated
links model if for all AM-adversary OAM, there exists an ideal-KE-adversary
OIDEAL such that
AUTHΠ,OAM() ≈c IDEALOIDEAL()
2. Secure in the UM-Model: If Π is a message driven key exchange protocol
for n parties, then Π is a secure key exchange protocol in the unauthenticated
links model if for all UM-adversary OUM, there exists an ideal-KE-adversary
OIDEAL such that
UNAUTHΠ,OUM() ≈c IDEALOIDEAL()
An illustration is given in Figure 4.3.
Then proof of security is based on two steps:
1. Given a key exchange protocol Π, associate it with an AM-adversary, and
prove that this protocol is a secure key exchange protocol in the authenticated
network (by showing that for any AM-adversary OAM there exists an ideal-
KE-adversary OIDEAL such that AUTHΠ,OAM() ≈c IDEALOIDEAL()).
2. Apply an authenticator C to Π to get another protocol Π′ = C(Π). By
Corollary 8 of [BCK98] conclude that Π′ is a secure key exchange protocol in
the unauthenticated links model.
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m, sigsA(m, rB, B)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Figure 4.4: Signature based MT-authenticator
4.6.7 Examples of MT-Authenticators
[BCK98] gives two examples of MT-authenticators; one is based on signature schemes
and the other on an encryption scheme and a MAC. The authentication is based
on a challenge-response design. That is, when A wishes to send a message m to B,
she sends m to B directly. To ensure m is really from A, B replies with a challenge
to A. A must respond to the challenge along with the inclusion of her first message
m, then B accepts. In the following, the two MT-Authenticators are described:
The Signature based MT-Authenticator
1. The initiator A sends message m to B (A also outputs ‘A sent m to B’ as the
protocol specifies).
2. Upon receiving m from A, B selects a random number rB ∈R {0, 1}k and
sends a challenge m, rB to A.
3. Upon receiving the challenge m, rB from B, A computes her signature sigsA(m, rB, B)
as the response and sends m, sigsA(m, rB, B) to B.
4. Upon receiving m, sigsA(m, rB, B) from A, B accepts m (that is, it outputs ’B
received m from A’).
As long as the signature scheme used in this MT-authenticator is secure against
chosen message attacks (that is, it satisfies the GMR ([GMR84, GMR88]) secu-
rity requirements), then the above protocol emulates an authenticator protocol in
unauthenticated networks. An illustration is shown in Figure 4.4. (Note that sigsA






Figure 4.5: Encryption and MAC based MT-authenticator
The Encryption and MAC based MT-Authenticator
1. The initiator A sends message m to B (A also outputs ‘A sent m to B’ as the
protocol specifies).
2. Upon receiving m from A, B selects a random number rB ∈R {0, 1}k and
sends m,EeA(rB) as a challenge to A.
3. Upon receiving the challenge m,EeA(rB) from B, A computes the MAC value
of m, B using rB as the MAC key. She then sends m, MACrB(m, B) to B.
4. Upon receiving m, MACrB(m, B) from A, B accepts m (that is, it outputs ‘B
received m from A’),
where EeA denotes the encryption of something using A’s public encryption key eA,
and MACrB denotes the MAC value using B’s random challenge as its MACing key.
This MT-authenticator emulates an authenticator protocol in unauthenticated
networks as long as the encryption scheme is secure against the chosen ciphertext
attacks (see [RS91]).
4.6.8 Summary and Discussion
The Bellare-Canetti-Krawcyzk’s model in [BCK98] takes a different approach to
secure authenticated key exchange from [BR93B] and [BWM97]. The model is
closely related to a design methodology, rather than just for providing a proof
of security. The model consists of three parts: the unauthenticated-links model,
the authenticated-links model, and the ideal key exchange process. Each model
is associated with an adversary with different abilities. To prove that a protocol
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is secure, the ultimate goal is to show that the adversary in the unauthenticated-
links model cannot do much more than an ideal-KE-adversary. This so-called a
modular approach introduces the concept of authenticators and MT-authenticators,
which can transform a secure protocol in the authenticated setting into a secure
protocol in the unauthenticated setting. [BCK98] already proposes and proves two
valid authenticators, then any protocol which can be proven to be a secure key
exchange protocol under the authenticated links model, can then be applied with
an authenticator to be secure in the unauthenticated-links model. Again, proving
a protocol’s security in the AM model requires showing that the AM-adversary
cannot do much more than an ideal-KE-adversary.
From the above procedure of proving security, the main job of proving in
[BCK98]’s model is really proving that a protocol is secure in the authenticated
setting. Unlike the techniques used in [BWM97] and [BR93B], this model seems to
be less work than the other two.
[BCK98] proved that the key transport protocol using encryption and the Diffie-
Hellman key exchange are both secure protocols in the authenticated links model.
By further applying authenticators to these two protocols, we get a secure au-
thenticated key transport protocol and a secure key exchange protocol. This also
shows that the models described in [BCK98] have a greater application in formal
modelling, not just restricted to the two-party key exchange scenario.




Desired Features of Authenticated
Key Exchange Protocols through
a Case Study of the
Station-to-Station(STS) protocol
In Chapter 1, the importance of an AKE protocol is already emphasized. The
following questions to ask would be “What are the things that needed to be included
in an AKE protocol in order for it to be secure?” and “How does one go about
creating a secure AKE protocol?”. The following two chapters are intended to
answer these two questions. The next chapter will focus on how to create a secure
AKE protocol; this chapter instead focuses on the features that should be taken
consideration into when one designs an AKE protocol. This is done via a case
study of the Station-to-Station (STS) protocol. STS has been under development
for a long period of time and has been adopted in many industrial standards. From
its original form to the present accepted one, flaws of it have been found and fixes
presented; it serves as a good example of some common mistakes protocol designers
have made over the past years. It is not guaranteed that studying STS may reveal
all the desired features in an AKE protocol. However, examining STS in detail can
nevertheless help future protocol designers to understand which issues they should
keep in mind.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: a quick introduction of different
forms of key establishment is presented, followed by a brief history of STS. Then
starting from the original protocol, I will demonstrate different attacks on STS and
the different fixes of it. Along with the illustration of attacks and fixes, discussions
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and comments will also be presented. By the end of this chapter, a secure version
with all the desired properties of STS is given. The proof of security of the final
version, however, is included in the next chapter together with the discussion of
design methodologies.
5.1 Key Establishment Protocols
The motivation of key establishment can come from various scenarios. It can be
considered in the PKI setting, where public key encryption is more computationally
expensive than secret key schemes, and if two entities wish to communicate with
each other, than they need to first apply public key cryptography to establish a
shared key k, and then encrypt any subsequent messages using secret key encryption
schemes with key k. Another scenario is the case where a client and a server share a
common secret to start with (say the client’s password). When the client wishes to
perform banking activities at the ATM, a good practice is that once the client has
authenticated itself, then a session key must be established between the ATM and
the server to encrypt all transactions, instead of just using the client’s password
as the session key. Key establishment plays a small part of a cryptosystem, but
it should certainly receive as much attention as other parts such as encryption,
signatures, etc.
Depending on the setting of the computation, key establishment can exist in
many forms. Key establishment can be in the symmetric setting where two parties
share a common secret to start with, the asymmetric setting (like the traditional
PKI which uses certificates); the key can be established between two parties or
between multiple entities of a group, and key exchange can be based on each per-
son’s identity or his/her password (e.g., ID or password-based key establishment).
Examples of secret-key and public-key based key establishment have been given in
the previous paragraph. Key establishment can also exist in an unauthenticated
(anonymity enabled) and authenticated (communication to only registered and cer-
tified members) manner. In this chapter and the rest of the thesis, the setting is
restricted to the scenario where the key establishment is between only two parties,
in the asymmetric setting.
Having the notion of security and the setting of computation, another problem
faced in designing an authenticated key exchange protocol is the choice of features
included or implemented in the actual protocol. For example, while not sacrificing
the security a protocol certainly one wishes to achieve minimal network flow over-
head possible. Specific to each design, a feature that can make one protocol secure
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by including it may not make other protocols secure.
5.1.1 Key Transport v.s. Key Exchange Protocols
A key transport protocol is a two-user protocol, in which one entity dominates the
key control ability. The other party of the communication has to rely completely
on the key offering party. Many existing systems, such as SSH and Kerboros are
or have key transport protocols. This technique is especially useful for the case
where one party has only limited computing power and cannot afford expensive
computations to participate in key establishment. Another suitable scenario is if
one of the entities is a server granting access to anonymous users. Then the server
may generate keys itself and force the users to use the keys in order to protect itself
from possible security problems.
5.2 STS: a Brief History
The Station-to-Station AKE Protocol was proposed by [DOW92]. The original
version of STS (which we will refer to it as STS-ENC) proposes the following
properties:
• Implicit key authentication: at the end of a successful protocol run (in which
both Alice and Bob accept), each party is sure that the other party has
sufficient material to compute the same established session key sk.
• Unknown-Key-Share (UKS) Resilience using encryption. UKS is the event
such that at the end of a protocol run where the adversary is actively present,
without loss of generality, Alice believes that she has communicated and es-
tablished a session key with Bob, but Bob instead believes that he has com-
municated and established with another entity, Oscar. UKS resilience is the
prevention of such an event from happening.
• No cryptographic service provider on a particular secret key by each entity
performing cryptographic operations on messages (signatures, encryption on
signatures) containing its own input (its own random element in the group or
challenge).
• Joint key control: the security of the key does not rely completely on only one
participant of the protocol; both Alice and Bob have to input their “share”
to establish the key.
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• (Entity) authentication (preventing the man-in-the-middle attacks) by pro-
viding signatures.
• Perfect forward secrecy using ephemeral keys. Perfect forward secrecy (perfect
FS) means that, the exposure of the long term keying material does not allow
the adversary to retrieve any information about any previously established
session keys.
• Preventing key-compromise impersonation (KCI) by signature schemes. KCI
is the event when a participant A of the protocol loses her or his long-term
keying information, and then others can impersonate themselves to A.
• No timestamps. Timestamps are marks or indicators specifying the “expiry
time” of a particular message. A timestamp can be used to ensure message
freshness (to prevent attacks using previous legitimate messages). However,
due to the difficulty of synchronization between different CPU clocks, and the
right duration of the “expiry time”, some of researchers do not recommend
the usage of timestamps in AKE protocols.
• Security of certificates: should include the Diffie-Hellman parameters - gen-
erator α and prime order p.
Ever since the publication of the protocol, much analysis has been done to
discover the possible flaws; some results suggest new, improved versions of it. In
particular, [DOW92] suggests that the symmetric encryption is essential in the
original proposal of the STS protocol. [BM] suggests that MACs should be used
instead of encryptions to provide data integrity. In [BW99] and in [BWM99], the
unknown key share attacks (UKS) have been proposed to attack STS. While many
argue that the UKS attack is not serious, I believe that it does model threats
possible in real life. Also, in [BWM99] Blake-Wilson and Menezes proposed a
variation of STS known as the STS-MAC, as well as some countermeasures to the
UKS attacks. Baek and Kim in [BK00], however, showed that the countermeasures
proposed in [BWM99] may not work if the underlying signature scheme is not
secure. [BCK98] suggests another variation, which will be referred to as STS-BCK,
and gave a security proof of it under the assumption that the signature scheme is
secure.
In later sections, I will describe the three variations of STS, and demonstrate
how the features of STS can achieve its desired properties by showing attacks to the
protocol when certain features are removed. The following section will be on UKS,
the only known attacks to STS. Two types of UKS will be described and proposed
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countermeasures are surveyed. In the third section two proofs of STS’s security
are given: one is from [BCK98] and another one is developed independently from
the proof given in [BCK98]. The last subsection will be some remarks on the STS
protocol.
5.3 Case Study of STS
Before describing the protocol, it is useful to clarify the notations that will be
used for the rest of this chapter. Due to complex details of the STS protocol, the
assumptions of the protocols should also be mentioned before the description.
5.3.1 Notation
• Alice and Bob both have a set of keys for different purposes. For any cryp-
tographic tools that takes Alice’s key as input (e.g. keyed MAC), then the
notation for it is the symbol of the cryptographic tool with subscript A. For
example, applying a MAC with Alice’s MAC key on a message m will be
denoted as MACA(m). Similarly, MACB(m) means applying MAC with Bob’s
MAC key on message m.
• If Alice and Bob wish to run STS to establish a session key at the end of
the protocol run, the developed session key is denoted as skAB. Note that
the order of subscripts is irrelevant. That is, skAB = skBA. If by context we
already know which two users are supposed to share the session key, then a
simpler notation of sk is used to represent the developed session key at the
end of a protocol run.
• The certificates of Alice and Bob are denoted as CA and CB, respectively.
• For simplicity, sometimes it is necessary to distinguish a random number
generated by one party from another. The random number generated by
Alice and Bob are denoted rA and rB, respectively.
• The generator of a group is denoted as α. The cyclic group generated by the
generater is denoted as 〈α〉.
• A → B denotes that Alice sends a message to Bob.
• The signature of Alice on a particular message m is sigA(m). Similarly for
Bob’s case.
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• Encrypting a message m using Alice’s private encryption key is denoted as
EA(m). Similarly for Bob’s case.
• The verification algorithm, using Alice’s public verification key, is denoted as
verA(m, s), where m is the message, and s represents the signature.
• The hash function on messages is denoted as H(·). However, notice that in
order to produce a signature on a long message m, a hash function is usually
used before the m is sent to the signature scheme. Therefore, the complete
way of hashing m and signing it (with signing key k) is sigk(H(m)). For
simplicity of describing the protocol, whenever a hash is needed for signing
purposes, we ignore writing out the hashing process unless otherwise specified.
Similarly, when verifying the message m with a corresponding signature s, the
verification algorithm has to take the hashed m as input instead of m itself.
Again this extra notation is ignored.
• The MAC, using key k, is denoted as MACk(·).
5.3.2 The Original Protocol
The STS protocol is an enhanced form of the Diffie-Hellman protocol. The original
protocol in [DOW92] is as follows:
1. Alice chooses a random number rA from Z∗q, computes RA = αrA then Alice→Bob:
m1 = (α, p, RA).
2. Bob chooses a random number rB from Z∗q, computes RB = αrB , skBA =
(RA)
rB , and SB = sigB(RB, RA) then Bob→Alice: m2 = (RB, CB , Esk(SB)).
3. Upon receiving m2, Alice checks whether verTA(CB) = true and extracts
verB from CB. Alice then verifies whether verB(SB, (RB, α
rA)) = true. If so,
Alice accepts and computes the session key skAB = sk = (RB)
rA . Alice then
computes SA = sigA(RA, RB)) and Alice→Bob: m3 = (CB, SA).
4. When Bob receives m3 from Alice, he checks whether verTA(CA) = true and
extracts verA from CA. Bob then verifies whether verA(SA, (RA, α
rB)) = true.
If so, then Bob accepts. The protocol terminates at this point.
This is illustrated in Figure 5.1.
In [DOW92], it claimed that STS achieves the above desired properties. The


























Figure 5.1: The Original STS Protocol
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• No Timestamps: It is easy to see that instead of using timestamps, challenges
are used for freshness.
• No Cryptographic Service Provider: the two cryptographic operations in-
volved in this protocol are encryption and signatures. In Alice’s case, she
signs the content (RA, RB) = (α
rA , αrB). In this signature, rA is in the con-
tent and is her own input, thus she is not signing something she has no control
of. Furthermore, Alice encrypts her signature, which already has her own in-
put, thus the content being encrypted is partially controlled by Alice as well.
Similarly, Bob also signs and encrypts contents he has control of.
• Joint Key Control: clearly, the session key skAB = skBA = αrArB involves
inputs from both participants in the protocol, and thus neither party can
force the session key to be in a particular format. Of course, in order for
an adversary to trivialize the session key, each participant should check that
the value he/she receives does not equal to 0 and 1. Also, the participants
should check that the values they receive is in the subgroup 〈α〉. Normally in
practice, α is carefully chosen so that α has order q, where q is a prime, and
there is only one subgroup with order q. To verify that an element is in 〈α〉,
one raise the element to the power of q and see if it results in 1.
• Perfect Forward Secrecy: The long-term keying material is the secret key for
each user’s signature scheme. In particular, the session key skAB = skBA =
αrArB is chosen independently from each user’s secret key. Therefore, compro-
mising the secret key of any user does not affect the security of the exchanged
keys from earlier runs (due to the usage of Diffie-Hellman key exchange).
• Entity Authentication and Implicit Key Authentication: Bob ensures that,
by Alice signing the random element αrA in the third flow, the messages he
receives in the first and third flow are from the same person. The certificate of
Alice is sent in the third flow so that Bob knows it is Alice he is communicating
with. This achieves authentication. Also, by seeing the encryption using the
session key sk on Alice’s signature, Bob ensures that Alice is able to compute
the session key. The Diffie-Hellman key exchange mechanism ensures that no
one other than Alice can compute the session key. From Alice’s point of view,
she verifies that it is Bob she is talking to by seeing Bob’s certificate. Also,
Bob has signed the content (αrA , αrB), in which αrA is the value she sends
in the first flow, and αrB matches the value sent from Bob. This ensures
that the signature from Bob is fresh, and Bob knows the session key. Again,
Diffie-Hellman key exchange ensures that no one else can possibly compute
the key.
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Each feature in the protocol is claimed to be essential. This can be shown by re-
moving a feature in the protocol and then demonstrating an attack on the protocol.
Recall that the original STS consists of exchanging two random numbers, signa-
tures on one’s own exponential and the other party’s exponential, encryption on the
signatures, and authentication with key exchange. The content in the signatures is
of the format
(< one’s own exponent >,< the other party’s exponent >).
An alternative to this format is to just sign the content in a particular order.
For example, both Alice and Bob may sign the content (αrB , αrA) instead of one
signing (αrB , αrA) and the other (αrA , αrB). I will refer to this property as the order
of signing exponents. In the following paragraphs, I will remove each feature one at
a time and then demonstrate an attack to emphasize the necessity of having that
particular feature in the protocol.
5.3.3 Using Static Exponents Instead of Random Expo-
nents
If the two parties use static exponents instead of random ones, then this pretty
much means between Alice and Bob there is only one long-term shared key in this
scenario, say αxAxB , where αxA is the static exponent of Alice and αxB is the static
exponent of Bob. Note that xA and xB are long-term private keys of Alice and Bob
since they serve the same purpose as if we choose any other long-term static keying
materials to perform key exchange. Immediately we can see that forward secrecy is
compromised. If one of xA or xB is known (WLOG we assume xA is known to the
adversary Oscar), then Oscar can compute the long-term shared key by computing
(RB)
xA = αxBxA = αxAxB . Thus any previously computed shared keys, which are
just αxAxB are known to Oscar.
5.3.4 Removing Signing One’s Own Exponential (i.e. Sign-
ing Only the Other Party’s Exponential)
If each party is signing only the other party’s exponential, the direct consequence is
that the two participants become a cryptographic service provider since whatever
is provided to the party, it is guaranteed to get her/him to sign it. [DOW92]
indicates that the adversary can potentially preselect logarithms and request this
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fixed quantity to be signed, but they could not suggest a general attack to this
modification of protocol.
Note that in this scenario, although Bob signs whatever is sent to him, he
does have control of how the signature should be encrypted by choosing his own
exponents to influence the session key. Therefore, Bob’s cryptographic service does
not come for free. Oscar will still need to solve the Diffie-Hellman problem to be
able to use the signature. Under the assumption that DHP is intractable, signing
only the other party’s signature with encryption under the session key does not
give Oscar the ability of using the signature directly. Note that the encryption in
this case helps data integrity and authentication in addition to using signatures. In
today’s practice, people tend to separate authentication, secrecy, and data integrity
using separate different cryptographic services instead of nesting one in the other.
Although the encryption protects the direct usage of signature cryptographic
service, there is still a concern about whether Oscar may use the signature indirectly
to conduct a successful attack. From Bob’s point of view, his goal in this protocol is
to ensure that 1) the person who talks to him in the protocol is really that person,
and 2) at the end of the protocol no one other than his intended participant is
able to compute the session key. The initiator, Alice, sends her key material and
signature for authentication in two different flows to demonstrate she knows the
session key and she is the one who sends the first message. However, Alice does not
get the same assurance this way. Bob sends both his key material AND signature
at the same time, so Alice’s only assurance is that 1) she has received an exponent
from an entity, 2) she has received the certificate of Bob, 3) using the exponent she
received, she can decrypt a received ciphertext and the decrypted message is Bob’s
signature on the exponent. What Alice is not sure is that whether Bob sends this
exponent and the signature intended for her. However, since no attack taking this
advantage of the protocol design has been found, such a concern is left as an open
problem.
5.3.5 Removing Signing the Other Party’s Exponential (i.e.
Signing Only One’s Own Exponential)
The immediate consequence of signing only one’s own exponential is the loss of
freshness and hence the protocol is vulnerable to a potential message-reply attack.
However, the freshness is again ensured by including the encryption using the es-
tablished session key sk so that both parties know the signature being encrypted is
bounded to this particular protocol run and is not a replayed message.
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[DOW92] suggested that no general attack was known during the time of the
publication of [DOW92]; the only known attack was a special case when the signa-
ture scheme is RSA, the hash function (used on a message, then sends the message
to the signature scheme) is the identity function, and the Diffie-Hellman key ex-
change is carried out over GF (p), where p is a prime. Oscar can impersonate Alice
in a run with Bob by using α0 as the exponential in the key exchange. Now Oscar’s
exponential is α0 = 1, and the exchanged session key sk = α0∗rB = 1. In order to
impersonate Alice, Oscar needs to compute Esk(sigA(H(α
0))) = E1(sigA(1)) (since
the hash function is the identity function) = E1(1) (due to RSA signature scheme).
Now E1(1) is easy to compute and Oscar can perform the following attack:
1. O(A) → B: α0 = 1
2. Bob computes sk = 1 regardless what his exponential is. Hence B → O(A):
αrB , CB, E1(sigB(α
rB))
3. O(A) → B: (CA, E1(sigA(1))) = (CA, E1(1))
4. Bob accepts, Oscar has successfully impersonated Alice.
Note that, regardless of the special scenario shown in the above attack, any
cryptographic protocols nowadays require that the recipient check that the expo-
nential he/she receives is not equal to 1 and that the generator α to the power
of the exponent has to lie in the cyclic subgroup 〈α〉. The attack is illustrated in
Figure 5.2.
5.3.6 Uncoupling Authentication from Key Exchange
If the STS protocol is modified such that each participant signs the content that
is independent of the exponentials, then it is vulnerable to the man-in-the-middle
attack ([RS84]). Suppose that Alice (the initiator) has to sign message M3 in flow
3 and Bob the responder has to sign message M2 in flow 2. Both M2 and M3 are
independent of the exponentials. The man-in-the-middle attack works as follows:
1. A → O(B): αrA , where rA ∈R Z∗q
2. O(A) → B: αrO1 , where rO1 is a number picked by Oscar himself.


























rArO2 skBO = α
rBrO1
αrO2 , CB, EskOA(sigB(M2))←−−−−−−−−−−−−− α
rB , CB, EskBO(sigB(M2))←−−−−−−−−−−−−−
“accept”
CA, EskOA(sigA(M3))−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ CA, EskBO(sigA(M3))−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
“accept”
Figure 5.3: Man-in-the-Middle Attack on STS Uncoupling Authentication from
Key Exchange
4. Note that Oscar can decrypt the message and retrieve the raw signature
sigB(M2) since the message M2 is independent of the exchanged exponentials.
Oscar then can encrypt the signature again using his session key with Alice.
Thus, O(B) → A: αrO2 , CB, EskOA(sigB(M2)), where skOA = αrArO2 .
5. Alice accepts and then A → O(B): CA, EskOA(sigA(M3))
6. Oscar now can decrypt EskOA(sigA(M3)) and retrieve the raw signature sigA(M3).
He then encrypt the signature using skBO and O(A) → A: CA, EskBO(sigA(M3)).
Upon receiving this message, Bob accepts.
In the above scenario, Oscar substitutes his own exponentials for Alice’s and
Bob’s exponentials. This action results in Oscar sharing session keys with both
Alice and Bob while Alice believes that Oscar is Bob and Bob believes Oscar is
Alice. Within the authentication part of the protocol, Oscar can pass on Bob’s
signature to Alice by decrypting Bob’s signature using their shared key skBO and
then encrypt the signature using the key he shares with Alice, skOA. Similarly,
Oscar can decrypt Alice’s signature then encrypt it again then send it to Bob.
5.3.7 Changing the Order of Signing Exponentials
This scenario was not considered in [DOW92] but was pointed out in [Sho99].
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Figure 5.4: Interleaving Attack on STS with Order of Signing Exponential Change
interleaving attack. In this scenario, the attacker Oscar can take the encrypted
signature output by Bob in the second flow, relay it to Alice (in the second flow)
and feed it back to Bob in the third flow. Thus, both Alice and Bob accept, and
Alice thinks she is talking to Bob while Bob thinks he is talking to an instance of
himself. To demonstrate the attack,
1. A → O(B): αrA
2. O → B: αrA
3. O ← B: αrB , CB,m = Esk(sigB(αrB , αrA))
4. A ← O(B): αrB , CB,m = Esk(sigB(αrB , αrA))
5. A → O(B): CA,m′ = Esk(sigA(αrB , αrA))
6. O → B: CB,m = Esk(sigB(αrB , αrA))
An illustration is shown in Figure 5.4.
The effect of this attack relates to unknown key share. In the above attack both
Alice and Bob accepts at the end of the protocol run. Alice has the right belief she
has exchanged a session key with Bob, and no one other than Bob may compute the
key. Bob, however, believes that he has exchanged a session key with an instance
of himself; no one but then himself can compute the key. It is an attack, although
it is not clear what subsequent damage Oscar can do to benefit himself.
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5.3.8 The Diversity: STS-MAC and STS-BCK
There are two other versions of STS published in the literature. One is suggested
in [BWM99] and this version which uses a MAC in replacement of the encryption
scheme. The other in [BCK98], by Bellare, Canatti, and Krawczyk, applies key-
exchange based on an authenticator for authentication. These two variations are
explained in the following. Note that in order to sign a particular message m,
m is always hashed first before being signed. Therefore, the following protocol
illustrations will omit the presence of a hash function, but the reader should keep
in mind that the message being signed is hashed before applying the signature
scheme.
The STS-MAC is described as follows (illustration shown in Figure 5.5):
1. A → B: αrA
2. A ← B: CB, αrB , sigB(αrB , αrA), MACsk(sigB(αrB , αrA))
3. A → B : CA, sigA(αrA , αrB), MACsk(sigA(αrA , αrB))
Here sk = αrArB is the session key established after a successful protocol run.
Note: In STS-MAC, each participant sends their signature without encryption
and adds an additional MAC value of the signature with the established key sk.
On the contrary, in STS-ENC the participants do not have to send an extra item
in flow 2 and 3, but their signatures are encrypted with sk.
STS-BCK is described as follows:
1. A → B: αrA
2. A ← B: αrB , CB, sigB(αrB , αrA , ID(A))
3. A → B: sigA(αrA , αrB , ID(B))
An illustration of STS-BCK is given in Figure 5.6.
Note that STS-BCK uses only one type of cryptographic service, namely signa-
tures, as compared to STS-ENC or STS-MAC, which use an additional encryption
or MAC in the protocol. Also, the established session key in STS-BCK is never
used in any protocol flow. STS-ENC and STS-MAC protocols, however, use the









SB ← sigB(RB, RA)












Figure 5.5: The STS-MAC Protocol
of applying an encryption or a MAC also implies that STS-BCK provides only
implicit key confirmation; while STS-ENC and STS-MAC both provides explicit
key confirmation. Another difference is that STS-BCK includes the identity of the
intended recipient in the outgoing signature and the other two do not.
From the literature, some papers would describe the above protocols with the
addition of an ID(A) in flow 1 and ID(B) in flow 2. In the figures the ID’s are
omitted and will be discussed later to emphasize the importance.
5.3.9 Lowe’s Attack
Before the publication of the model by Blake-Wilson, Johnson, and Menezes, Lowe









RB, CB, sigB(RB, RA, ID(A))←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
sk ← (RB)rA
“accept”
CA, sigA(RA, RB, ID(B))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
“accept”
Figure 5.6: The STS-BCK Protocol
tion of authentication. Many subsequent papers in the literature have doubted the
validity of Lowe’s attack, but this attack foreshadows the unknown key share attack,
as well as suggesting the importance of unknown key-share resilience (although I
would prefer to call it mutual belief of identity).
Lowe’s definition of authentication in [Lowe96] is quoted “Whenever an agent A
completes a run in the protocol, apparently with B, then B has recently been running
the protocol, apparently with A, and the two agents agree upon who initiated the
run, and agree upon all data values used in the run; further, there is a one-one
relationship between the runs of A and the runs of B.” In other words, two points
are made:
• if user A accepts at the end of the protocol, if A’s intended peer in the protocol
is B, then B’s intended peer must be A. If A believes she is the initiator, then
B must believe that A is the initiator. Similar for the case of A believing
herself as the responder.
• At the end of the protocol A and B have a matching conversation.
The idea of Lowe’s attack is essentially the same as unknown key share: At the








Figure 5.7: STS-ENCi, STS-ENC with ID(A) in the first flow
key with Bob, while Bob is not aware that he is talking to Alice. The controversy
of Lowe’s attack is that in this attack Oscar can only impersonate Bob to Alice
(thus Alice accepts), but then Bob does not accept in the protocol. Alice believes
that she shares a key with Bob but Bob does not have a successful run at all.
To conduct the attack, Lowe used a modified version of STS-ENC where in
the first flow, Alice sends not only her randomly-chosen exponential αrA but also
her identity ID(A). For convenience this modification will be referred to as the
STS-ENCi (see Figure 5.7.
The attack is described as follows:
1. A → O(B): ID(A), αrA
2. O → B: ID(O), αrA
3. O ← B: αrB , CB, Esk(sigBob(αrB , αrA))
4. A ← O(B): αrB , CB, Esk(sigB(αrB , αrA))
5. A accepts. A → O(B): CA, Esk(sigA(αrA , αrB)). Oscar drops the last message
to Bob, and Bob never accepts.
Without the inclusion of ID(A), this attack is essentially relaying messages back
and forth (except for the last message from Alice to Bob, which Oscar just drops
it). So what is the difference?
Intuitively, Alice accepts and all her beliefs are correct (1. Bob has identified
himself to Alice, 2. she has established a key with her intended participant Bob,
and Bob has all the information to compute the established key, 3. no one other
than Bob or herself can compute the key). From Bob’s point of view, however, he
thinks he has an unsuccessful run with Oscar, and he does not accept at the end
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of the protocol. Oscar also does not know any information about the established
session key, so even though Alice thinks she is talking to Bob and in fact she is
talking to Oscar, Oscar does not seem to be able to use any subsequent message
from Alice (under the encryption using the established key) to benefit himself.
Also, this type of scenario is still covered in the scope of a secure authenticated key
exchange protocol (but not a secure authenticated key exchange protocol with key
confirmation) under the definition of [BWJM97].
However, [Mao] argues that with the inclusion of ID(A) in the first flow, at
the time where Alice accepts, the recorded messages of Alice does not match the
recorded messages kept by Bob. This violates the definition of authentication of
[DOW92] and [Lowe96]. Also, consider the following scenario: Alice is a server
providing services to requests from legitimate users. When a user Bob requests a
service, Alice initiates an AKE protocol to make Bob identify himself to her and to
exchange a session key. Once accepted in flow 2, Alice reserves some resources in
preparation to provide service to Bob. Once the protocol is successfully completed,
Alice then provides the service in encrypted form. If Oscar simply drops the last
message from Alice to Bob, then Bob would send Alice a not-acknowledged (NAK)
message and the protocol run may be unsuccessful. However, if Bob is thinking he
is talking to Oscar, then Bob’s NAK message would be directed to Oscar instead of
Alice. However, Alice has now accepted Bob’s identity and is preparing resources
to service Bob; nobody will notify Alice of any abnormality. If Oscar applies this
attack with multiple instances, Alice’s capacity of serving other end users may
drastically drop and may even power down. This is an instance of perfect denial of
service attack (perfect DoS, [Mao]). The difference between a perfect DoS and the
conventional DoS is that Oscar is not required to provide a certificate in a perfect
DoS and the cost of Oscar is very small compared to Alice.
Side Discussion
The difference between the original STS-ENC and STS-ENCi is that in STS-ENC,
Bob does not know who his intended peer is until the third flow (by looking at the
certificate). If Bob does not receive the third flow, then the only way he knows
who to send a NAK message to is through IP addresses or he may even not send
any messages at all. In the former case, the perfect DoS is still possible since
Alice will wait for a response from Bob, but in the later scenario, the perfect DoS
seems not possible. Comparatively, STS-ENCi ensures that Bob knows his intended
participant in the first flow, and thus knows who to send a NAK message to if he
does not receive the third flow.
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5.3.10 The Unknown Key Share Attack
In 1999, Blake-Wilson and Menezes introduced the unknown key share attack to
STS-ENC and STS-MAC. The idea is to make one party, say Alice, believe that at
the end of the protocol run, she is indeed communicating with Bob and no one other
than Bob can compute the session key sk. However, Alice’s intended participant,
Bob, believes that he is communicating with the adversary Oscar and no one but
Oscar can compute the session key sk. Note that the session key Alice computes is
the same as the session key Bob has. This attack can be conducted against either the
initiator or the responder. In [BWM99] Blake-Wilson and Menezes suggest several
possible countermeasures including public key validation (proof of possession of
corresponding private key), enforced exchange of certificates before start of protocol,
and adding the identity of the intended recipient, the identity of the sender, and the
flow number in the signature. In [BK00], Baek and Kim demonstrate that the UKS
attack is still possible after including the ID of the intended recipient, ID of the
sender, and the flow number in the signature if the signature scheme used in STS is
either ElGamal or RSA. Baek and Kim’s paper suggest a potential need to revise
the definition of a secure signature scheme for data integrity and authentication.
Similar to Lowe’s attack, there are concerns about whether UKS constitutes a valid
attack, how realistic it can be, and how serious the damage could be in real life.
To show the possibility of UKS damages in practice, [BWM99] suggests two
hypothetical scenarios that might happen in real life:
Scenario A: Suppose that Bob is a bank server and Alice is an account holder.
An electronic deposit system uses an authenticated key exchange protocol (WLOG,
say STS) to establish a share key between Alice and Bob. At the end of protocol
Alice then uses the shared key to encrypt the amount of money for deposit without
further authentication. If Oscar conducts the UKS attack so that Bob the bank
thinks his communication session is with Oscar, then when Alice transmitted the
encrypted amount to Bob, the money will be deposited into Oscar’s account instead
of hers.
Scenario B: Suppose Bob controls access to a suite of sensitive applications
(e.g. account information, salary database, etc.). Each application is associated
with a password. A trusted authority TA distributes certificate and public keys to
all the users who may use the applications. The TA also chooses the passwords for
each application and distributes them securely to each user eligible or entitled to
use a certain application. When a user Alice wishes to use an application, she starts
an authenticated key exchange protocol with Bob. At the end of the protocol run,
she then encrypts using the established session key the password associated with
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the application she wishes to have access to. Bob decrypts the message from Alice
and check if the password is valid. If so, then access is granted to Alice. Suppose
Oscar performs the UKS attack so that Alice thinks she’s exchanged keys with
Bob and Bob thinks he’s exchanged keys with Oscar, then Bob will treat Alice’s
subsequent encrypted message as coming from Oscar. If Alice’s password is valid,
then the access to this particular application will be granted to Oscar but not Alice.
There are two types of UKS attack described in [BWM99]; I will refer to them
as the public key substitution UKS (PKS-UKS) and the duplicate-signature key
selection UKS (DSKS-UKS) for ease of reference and consistency with [BK00].
Regarding the possibility of UKS attacks happening in real life, [BWM99] has
stated the assumptions essential for UKS to be carried out.
To perform public key substitution UKS, the adversary must be able to register
public keys of his own choice. Also, the TA should also allow duplicate public key
values. In order to carry out DSKS-UKS, two other assumptions have to be made:
1. The signature scheme used in STS has the duplicate-signature key selection
property. That is, given Alice’s public key PA, a message M , and the corre-
sponding signature sA, it is possible for Oscar to find a different public/private
key pair (PO, SO), where PO 6= PA, such that sA is also Oscar’s signature on
M . Protocols that propose this property include RSA, Rabin, ElGamal, DSA,
and ECDSA signature schemes.
2. The adversary Oscar can get his public key certified during a protocol run.
This situation is possible in situations where delays in the transmission of
messages are normal, and the TA is online to provide certification services.
The idea of PKS-UKS is as follows: when Alice sends Bob the messages (ID(A),
αrA), the adversary Oscar simply replaces ID(A) with ID(O). In the second flow,
Oscar just forwards Bob’s message to Alice, although Bob’s intended participant is
Oscar. When Alice sends the message in flow 3, Oscar replaces Alice’s certificate
with his own, and sends to Bob. Here Bob is the entity being led to false beliefs and
the attack is said to be against the responder. If the UKS is carried out such that
Alice is led to false beliefs instead of Bob, then it is an attack against the initiator.
PKS-UKS Attack on STS-ENCi Against the Responder
1. A → O(B): ID(A), αrA
2. O → B: ID(O), αrA
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3. O ← B: αrB , CB, Esk(sigB(αrB , αrA))
4. A ← O(B): αrB , CB, Esk(sigB(αrB , αrA))
5. A → O(B): CA, Esk(sigA(αrA , αrB))
6. O → B: CO, Esk(sigA(αrA , αrB))
Note that Oscar registers his public key as Alice’s and thus sigA(α
rA , αrB) =
sigO(α
rA , αrB). When Bob verifies the signature in flow 3, the signature is valid
and represents Oscar’s identity; Bob accepts.
PKS-UKS Attack on STS-ENCi Against the Initiator
In this scenario, Oscar registers his public key the same as Bob’s (so to be against
Alice the initiator). The attack is described below:
1. A → O: ID(A), αrA
2. O(A) → B: ID(A), αrA
3. O(A) ← B: αrB , CB, Esk(sigB(αrB , αrA))
4. A ← O: αrB , CO, Esk(sigB(αrB , αrA))
5. A → O: CA, Esk(sigA(αrA , αrB))
6. O(A) → B: CA, Esk(sigA(αrA , αrB))
Again, Oscar registers his public key the same as Bob’s, then sigB(α
rB , αrA) =
sigO(α
rB , αrA). When Alice verifies it in flow 2, Alice accepts Oscar’s identity.
Similarly, the PKS-UKS attack can be applied to STS-MAC. Here we use a
modification of STS-MAC, adding ID(A) in the first flow and this modification
will be referred to as STS-MACi. Notice that PKS-UKS is also possible to be
applied to STS-MAC.
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PKS-UKS Attack on STS-MACi Against the Responder
1. A → O(B): ID(A), αrA
2. O → B: ID(O), αrA
3. O ← B: αrB , CB, sigB(αrB , αrA), MACsk(sigB(αrB , αrA))
4. A ← O(B): αrB , CB, sigB(αrB , αrA), MACsk(sigB(αrB , αrA))
5. A → O(B): CA, sigA(αrA , αrB), MACsk(sigA(αrA , αrB))
6. O → B: CO, sigA(αrA , αrB), MACsk(sigA(αrA , αrB))
PKS-UKS Attack on STS-MACi Against the Initiator
1. A → O: ID(A), αrA
2. O(A) → B: ID(A), αrA
3. O(A) ← B: αrB , CB, sigB(αrB , αrA), MACsk(sigB(αrB , αrA))
4. A ← O: αrB , CO, sigB(αrB , αrA), MACsk(sigB(αrB , αrA))
5. A → O: CA, sigA(αrA , αrB), MACsk(sigA(αrA , αrB))
6. O(A) → B: CO, sigA(αrA , αrB), MACsk(sigA(αrA , αrB))
Note that due to this attack, both STS-ENC and STS-MAC fail to achieve the
definition in [BWJM97] of a secure AKC protocol. However, both STS-ENC and
STS-MAC are still secure AKI protocols under [BWJM97]’s definition.
This attack is possible due to the fact that Oscar can choose duplicate values for
his public key and register it even without knowing what the corresponding value
is. One way to prevent this attack from happening is to force each public key to
be distinct. However this mechanism seems very complicated and does not seem to
scale in terms of key management. [BWM99] then emphasize the essence of public
key validation (or proof of possession) - when an user registers a public key, the TA
must force the user to prove (in zero knowledge, perhaps) his/her knowledge of the
corresponding private key before issuing his/her certificate.
The duplicate signature key selection UKS (DSKS-UKS) attack is based on the
assumptions that the certification authority is always online and a participant can
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register his/her public key during a protocol run. This type of attack bypasses the
public key validation process and implies to be a stronger attack than PKS-UKS.
The idea behind DSKS-UKS is that given Alice’s message m and her signature
on m, Oscar can select a valid public/private key pairs such that his signature on m
is the same as Alice’s. Furthermore, [BK00] illustrated that in some circumstances,
DSKS-UKS can be carried out even in situations where Oscar can freely choose a
fixed static message m ′ that may or may not be different from Alice’s message m,
and produces a valid signature sigO(m
′) that is equal to Alice’s signature on m,
sigA(m).
DSKS-UKS Attack on STS-MACi Against the Initiator
1. A → O: ID(A), αrA
2. O(A) → B: ID(A), αrA
3. O(A) ← B: αrB , CB, sigB(αrB , αrA), MACsk(sigB(αrB , αrA))
4. Now Oscar selects a public/private key pair (yO, xO) so that the signature
sigO(α
rB , αrA) is the same as sigB(α
rB , αrA).
A ← O: αrB , CO, sigB(αrB , αrA), MACsk(sigB(αrB , αrA))
5. A → O: CA, sigA(αrA , αrB), MACsk(sigA(αrA , αrB))
6. O(A) → B: CO, sigA(αrA , αrB), MACsk(sigA(αrA , αrB))
DSKS-UKS Attack on STS-MACi Against the Responder
1. A → O(B): ID(A), αrA
2. O → B: ID(O), αrA
3. O ← B: αrB , CB, sigB(αrB , αrA), MACsk(sigB(αrB , αrA))
4. A ← O(B): αrB , CB, sigB(αrB , αrA), MACsk(sigB(αrB , αrA))
5. A → O(B): CA, sigA(αrA , αrB), MACsk(sigA(αrA , αrB))
6. Oscar now picks public/private key pairs (yO, xO) so that the signature
sigO(α
rA , αrB) is the same as sigA(α
rA , αrB). Then
O → B: CO, sigA(αrA , αrB), MACsk(sigA(αrA , αrB))
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The DSKS-UKS attacks on STS-ENCi are similar to the attacks on STS-MACi
and thus will be omitted.
In DSKS-UKS attacks, the adversary knows the private key xO corresponding
to its public key yO so that public-key validation does not prevent this type of
attacks.
To prevent such an attack, [BWM99] suggests the following countermeasures:
1. Instead of sending her certificate in flow 3, Alice sends her certificate in flow
1. Since usually a certificates often consist of ID of a participant, the ID(A)
message in flow 1 can be omitted, thus reduce the overhead in flow messages.
This way prevents the DSKS-UKS against the responder. However the attack
against the initiator is still possible.
2. The protocol can require that, at the start of the protocol, the two intended
parties in the protocol must exchange their certificates. Under this situation
the assumption of DSKS-UKS no longer holds and thus the attack (which
heavily depends on the assumption that certificates can be issued during a
protocol run) fails. However, as indicated in [BWM99], a priori exchange
of certificates increase the overhead of the protocol and sometimes may be
undesirable.
3. Include the identities of the sender and intended receiver as well as the flow
number in the messages being signed. An improvement of this solution is
further to remove the MAC on the signatures. As pointed out in [BWM99]
and many other articles, once the MAC under the session key sk has been
exposed in the protocol flow, an eavesdropper can tell the MAC value of a
specific message under sk; the adversary can use this to distinguish sk from
a randomly uniformly selected key and thus violates the indistinguishability
property of keys. Therefore, [BWM99] suggests the protocol to be
(a) A → B: ID(A), αrA
(b) A ← B: CB, αrB , sigB(2, ID(B), ID(A), αrB , αrA)
(c) A → B: CA, sigA(3, ID(A), ID(B), αrA , αrB)
The above protocol will be referred to as STS-MAC1. [BWM99] claims that
this modification in message format can prevent the DSKS-UKS. However,
it was later pointed out (in [BK00]) that inclusion of the identities of the
sender and the intended participant, and the flow number does not prevent
the DSKS-UKS attacks (more to follow).
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4. Instead of MAC the signature being sent, MACing the content of the signa-
ture. This is actually a standard ISO 11770-3, which are variants of STS-ENC
and STS-MAC. The variation of STS-MAC will be referred to as ISO-STS-
MAC and is described as follows:
(a) A → B: ID(A), αrA
(b) A ← B: CB, αrB , sigB(αrB , αrA , ID(A)), MACsk(αrB , αrA , ID(A))
(c) A → B: CA, sigA(αrA , αrB , ID(B)), MACsk(αrA , αrB , ID(B))
In the above suggested solutions, solution 1 does not fully solve the problem
since the attack against the initiator is still possible. Solution 2 proposes a change
in the assumption of the DSKS-UKS attack: if certificates are to be changed at
the beginning of the protocol, this pretty much means that only registered users
can participate in the protocol, and there would be no point in allowing registering
public keys during a protocol run.
Solution 3 is a variation of STS-BCK; the difference is that STS-BCK only
has signatures on the two exponentials and the ID of the intended recipient, while
solution 3 has signatures on the two exponentials, the ID of the intended recipient,
flow number, and the ID of the sender. In [BK00], Baek and Kim argued that
solution 3 from above would not work if the signature schemes used are ElGamal
or RSA.
Assume the ElGamal signature scheme is used in STS. Then the public key pa-
rameters of Alice is the triple (p, α, yA), where yA = α
xA , yA is A’s public key, and
xA is Alice’s private key. p is a large prime with α being a generator for Z∗p. In flow
3 of STS-MAC1, Alice sends Bob the message m3 = (3, α
rA , αrB , ID(A), ID(B)),
and the signature on m3 is sigA = (r, s) = (α
k, k−1(H(m3) − xAr)), where H
is a hash function used on messages before signing. Let h = H(m3). Bob ver-
ifies Alice’s message by checking whether α−hyrAr
s ≡ 1 mod p. If so then the
verification scheme outputs “valid”, “invalid” otherwise. In the scenario of at-
tack against the responder, upon seeing these messages, Oscar computes h′ =
H(3, αrA , αrB , ID(O), ID(B)) (note that this message replaces Alice’s ID with Oscar’s).
Let q be a large prime which divides p− 1. If gcd(s,p− 1)6=1 or if gcd(h′, r) = 2 or
q, then Oscar terminates with failure. Otherwise, Oscar selects x′ ∈R Zq, computes
t = h′ − x′r and the new public parameter (p, α, yO) will be (p, (rs)t−1 , αx′). Note
that Oscar knows the private key x′ that corresponds to his public key αx′. Oscar
registers his new public parameters in real time and gets his certificate CO issued
containing the new public values.
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Bob now receives CO and (r, s) in flow 3. Within the certificate Bob retrieves the
public value (p, α, yO), and he verifies the signature (r, s) with the public parameter
(p, α, yO). Bob first computes h


























Thus, Bob accepts. A similar illustration can be given for the RSA case.
So in the STS-BCK protocol, the adversary can just perform what’s described
above when he sees the message sent by Alice in flow 3. However, the adversary
faces a slightly more challenging situation if dealing with STS-MAC1. In that pro-
tocol, both the intended recipient and the the sender is included in the signature.
If Oscar simply forwards Bob’s message to Alice in flow 2, Alice would immedi-
ately notice that Bob’s intended participant is Oscar rather than her. Therefore,
on top of having to modify the message in flow 3, Oscar now also has to modify
the message in flow 2 and come up with a valid public parameter for that modified
message. That is, Oscar must come up with a public key yO2 such that the signa-
ture sigyO2(m
′) = sigB(2, ID(B), ID(A), αrB , αrA) instead of the original signature
sigB(2, ID(B), ID(A), α
rB , αrA). If Oscar is able to do it, then Oscar has performed
an existential forgery to the signature scheme. If the protocol uses any signature
scheme that is GMR-secure ([GMR84]), then this attack is not possible. Even in
situations where the signature scheme is not GMR-secure, the intuition suggests
that it is very unlikely for the two public keys Oscar has to produce in flow 2 and
flow 3 to be the same; Oscar must re-register his public key during the protocol run.
The original assumption only states that Oscar is allowed to register his public key
during a protocol run, but does not specify whether Oscar can change/re-register
public keys during a protocol run. In most real-life systems, users are allowed to
change their password/public keys at their own will, and it is a good practice to
change keys often. This implies such an attack is possible and realistic but Oscar
would certainly create more delays in the protocol. Whether Oscar may success-
fully conduct the attack before the protocol times out is another issue Oscar has
to consider.
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In STS-MAC1, however, Bob needs to know the ID of his intended participant
before flow 2 so that he can produce a proper signature used in the protocol. Bob
gets the ID in flow 1. Again, instead of sending ID(A), Alice’s certificate can be
sent and the same certificate does not have to be sent in flow 3. This way reduces
the overhead of the flow and achieves the same purpose as STS-MAC1. However,
sending certificate in flow 1 will then imply solution 1 suggested above, so the claim
here is that solution 3 is just equivalent to solution 1. Similarly, STS-BCK requires
signing the other party’s ID and this makes DSKS-UKS not possible.
It seems at first sight that [BK00] is wrongfully worried about the security of
STS. However, it does bring up two important issues of related issues: (1) the proper
security definition of a signature scheme, and (2) the proper usage of a signature
scheme. In the original GMR-security of signature schemes, we are pretty much
assuming there is only one user in the world who has public keys and can sign
messages; everyone else is just an verifier. Clearly it is not the case of today’s
world. The GMR-security is often referred to as the security of signature schemes
in the single-user setting. Apparently, a more proper definition of secure signature
schemes should be in a multi-user setting instead. This leads to [MS04]’s definition
of a signature scheme.
Note that enforcing public keys to be distinct in all three versions considered
here does not help in preventing the attack: the attacker can select a message in
a format of his choice and creates the corresponding private/public key pairs such
that the signature used by Alice is also his signature on the new modified message.
(see [MS04])
5.4 Summary of Chapter
In this chapter, a case study of STS is conducted to examine the desired features a
secure AKE should possess. The results from many previous papers are combined
together to give an integrated presentation. After demonstrating several attacks
described in the literature, a secure version of STS which possesses all the desired
features, STS-BCK, is given (under the multi-party security definition of signature
schemes).
In Chapter 6, we will also demonstrate a design methodology gives a secure AKE
protocol with all the desired features by showing an AKE protocol constructed via






6.1 Introduction and Overview
From the previous chapters, we now have a model of communication, the definition
of secure authenticated key exchange protocols, and a list of desired of features of
such a protocol. The only question left in creating a real secure authenticated key
exchange protocol is how to design one.
Similar to the case in treating notions of security, the “attack and fix” approach
seems unreasonable. Of course, people can always come up with a protocol and
give a model for proof of security, but the method used to create the protocol
in the first place is still “out of thin air”. Even though Bellare and Rogaway’s
model is an important milestone in treating authenticated key exchange protocols,
proving a protocol is secure under the Bellare-Rogaway model (perhaps with slight
modification to fit various settings) is still a difficult job. It would be much nicer if a
general approach can be adapted so that there is a universal step-by-step guideline
to creating a secure AKE protocol.
In this chapter, two design approaches are presented and investigated. One is
referred to as Bellare-Canetti-Krawczyk’s Modular approach (or the BCK modular
approach, or the modular approach for short), where they start with a key exchange
protocol in an “ideal” setting, then apply their authenticators to yield an authenti-
cated key exchange (or transport) protocol in a real, unauthenticated setting. The
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second one is referred to as the progressive approach, which takes an existing se-
cure mutual authentication protocol that uses two challenge-response phases, and
replaces the random challenges with Diffie-Hellman exponentials to create a secure
authenticated key exchange protocol. (Note that the progressive approach is very
similar to the design methodology suggested by Bellare and Rogaway in [BR93B],
but the settings for each method are very different.) We describe how each of the
approach work by adapting each approaches to establish the same secure version of
the STS protocol. The proof of security will be given, and followed by discussions,
comparisons, and comments on these two approaches.
6.2 The Bellare-Canetti-Krawczyk’s Modular Ap-
proach
This section is the description of the design methodology in [BCK98]. Please note
that the formal model and definition of security of [BCK98] is described in Section
4.6; This section focuses on the steps in creating secure AKE protocols.
6.2.1 Overview and Concept
The world of [BCK98] has three parts: (1) An ideal world where key exchange
is always safe; the adversary can do no harm to a key exchange protocol. (2)
An authenticated environment where all messages sent in this environment are
authenticated. Adversaries cannot send any messages and claim it is from another
entity. (3) The “real world”; the adversary is powerful and can do various things (as
will be explained later) to attack honest participants. Environment (3) resembles
the normal computing environment we are in, and the other two are the worlds we
wish to have.
The idea of the modular design approach is to first look at a simpler version
of authenticated key exchange, namely just key exchange, then add additional
authentication feature into the protocol. The design approach in this world takes
the following steps, and an illustration is given in Figure 6.1:
1. Design a key exchange protocol KE and prove, in the authenticated network,
that the adversary cannot be more harmful than an adversary in the ideal
key exchange world.
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2. Apply an authenticator to KE to yield a modified protocol KE′. Prove that KE′
in the unauthenticated network emulates KE in the authenticated network.
By Theorem 3 of [BCK98] KE′ is a secure authenticated key exchange protocol
in the “real world”.
6.2.2 Constructing the Secure STS-BCK
Given the above design methodology, we now demonstrate an example of applying
the modular approach to design a secure key exchange protocol. The examples of
secure key exchange protocols in the authenticated links model, given in [BCK98],
are the Diffie-Hellman key exchange and an encryption based key transport pro-
tocol ([BCK98] does not seem to distinguish key exchange and key transport very
much). Also, three examples of MT−authenticators are given: one is based on a
secure signature scheme (under the GMR definition of security), one is based on a
secure MAC, and another is based on a secure encryption scheme. In our example,
the Diffie-Hellman key exchange (DH) and the signature based MT−authenticator,
MT− sig, and its corresponding authenticator λsig are used to construct the secure
authenticated key exchange protocol in the unauthenticated links network.
For a review of the Diffie-Hellman problem (DHP), the reader can refer back to
Subsection 3.3. The Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol is derived almost directly
from DHP. Suppose two entities A and B wish to establish a key sk. They first
agree on a group Zp, where p is a prime, a generator α ∈ Zp with order q, where
q is another prime. A first picks (uniformly and randomly) an exponent rA ∈R Z∗q
and sends βA = α
rA to B. B then picks uniformly and randomly another exponent
rB ∈R Z∗q and sends βB = αrB to A. A computes the established key as (βB)rA =
(αrB)rA = αrArB . B computes the established key as (βA)
rB = (αrA)rB = αrArB . An
illustration is given in Figure 6.2. From [BCK98] the protocol DH is proven to be a
secure key exchange protocol in the authenticated environment, provided that the
DDH is intractable.
The signature-based MT-authenticator is as follows. If A wishes to send message
m to B in an authenticated fashion, she first sends m to B. Upon receiving m, B
replies with m and a challenge r′B to A. After A receives the reply from B, she
sends the same message m, along with her signature on the tuple consisting of m,
the random challenge r′B, and B’s identity ID(B). B verifies that the signature
he receives is valid, then outputs “B has received message m from A”. (This
output can take various forms. For example, the output may be a transition to the
“accept” state internal to B’s machine.) Figure 6.3 illustrates the signature-based
MT-authenticator.
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sk = βrAB = α
rArB sk = βrBA = α
rArB




m, sigA(m, rB, ID(B))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
“B received m from A”
Figure 6.3: Signature based MT-Authenticator
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As explained in [BCK98], an MT-authenticator can be used to construct an
authenticator and to apply to secure protocols in the authenticated links model to
achieve security in the unauthenticated links model. It authenticates every message
transferred in the protocol. Therefore, the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol
DH can be further developed using the signature based authenticator:
1. (Flow 1 of DH) Alice tries to send a random exponent αrA to Bob. Alice picks
a random exponent rA ∈R {Z∗q} and sends αrA to Bob.
2. (Flow 1 of DH) Bob sends back αrA and his random challenge rB’ to Alice.
3. (Flow 1 of DH) Alice sends her exponential, αrA , and her signature on αrA ,
r′B, and ID(B) to Bob. Bob accepts the exponential as being authenticated.
4. (Flow 2 of DH) Bob uniformly randomly picks an exponent rB and sends α
rB
to Alice.
5. (Flow 2 of DH) Alice sends Bob αrB and her random challenge r′A.
6. (Flow 2 of DH) Bob sends back αrB and his signature on αrB , r′A, and ID(A).
Alice accepts αrB as an authenticated message. Each Alice and Bob computes
the session key to be sk = αrArB .
An illustration is shown in Figure 6.4.
6.2.3 Proof of Security
To show the security of STS-BCK version 1, the first step is to apply Proposition
9 of [BCK98], which says that the protocol DH is a secure key exchange protocol
in the authenticated links network. Theorem 3 and Proposition 4 of [BCK98] say
that the described method of incorporating the signature based MT-authenticator
gives an authenticator. Finally, Corollary 8 of [BCK98] ensures that applying the
signature-based MT-authenticator to DH results in a secure key exchange protocol
in the unauthenticated network. Thus we have a proof. Note that the proofs in
[BCK98] are partially sketches; there does not seem to be a complete proof of
[BCK98]’s claim in the literature. In [Sho99], however, Shoup says the proofs in
the BCK model does not resemble enough real-life situations and one protocol safe
in the BCK model can be still vulnerable in real life. See also the Appendix in the
full version of [CK01].
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rA , r′B, ID(B))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→




rA , r′A, ID(A))←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
sk = αrArB sk = αrArB
Figure 6.4: STS-BCK Version 1
6.2.4 Further Refinement
Obviously, the STS-BCK version 1 is not the STS-BCK we showed in the previous
chapter. However, notice that the exponentials sent from A to B and vice versa are
in a way also random values. Therefore, there are some redundancies in STS-BCK
version 1, and the overheads in the protocol flows can be further optimized.
Note that B sends a random challenge r′B in flow 2 of STS-BCK version 1, and
B also sends his random exponential αrB in flow 4. If we make these two random
values equal and they are sent in the same flow, the order of authenticating flow 2
of DH will not be changed. Correspondingly, A’s signature in flow 3 will be on the
content of her random exponential, B’s random exponential, and the ID of B. The
resulting protocol, referred to as STS-BCK version 2, is illustrated in Figure 6.5.
Notice that STS-BCK version 2 has 4 flows as compared to 6 flows in STS-
BCK version 1. In version 1, the overheads consists of transmission of 6 random
exponentials, 2 random values (which may or may not be from the random expo-
nential domain), and two signatures (Note that the length of a signature is usually
bounded regardless of the content being signed. Therefore, the extra content in a
signature does not imply more overhead in a protocol flow.) However, in version 2,





αrA , αrB , sigA(α
rA , αrB , ID(B))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
αrB , sigB(α
rB , αrA , ID(A))←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
sk = αrArB sk = αrArB
Figure 6.5: STS-BCK Version 2
(as opposed to 2 in version 1), and 2 signatures. The reduced number of protocol
flows and the reduced overhead in the flows will mean improvement in the run time
in actual implementation. Also, the order of message transfer of the authenticator
is preserved, therefore it seems reasonable (although no proof is given) that the
security of STS-BCK version 2 is not compromised.
[BCK98] gives an “outline” of truncating the excessive overheads in applying
authenticators. The paper claims that the original 6-flow protocol can be reduced
into a 3-flow one by “piggy-backing” the messages. However, it is not clear to the
author how the protocol can be simplified without altering the order of an authenti-
cator applied in the protocol, and how one can be sure that the simplified protocol
is still secure (since it is in a different form from the original one). Let the secure
3-flow version of STS-BCK be named STS-BCK version 3 for now. Blake-Wilson
and Menezes in [BWM98] present the protocol produced by their interpretation of
[BCK98] is STS-BCK version 3. The simplification process and the preservation
of security after simplification remains unclear, but the protocol from [BWM98] is
illustrated in Figure 6.6.
Note that the number of flows in version 3 has been reduced from 4 to 3. The
overheads in version 3 consist of transmitting only 2 random exponentials and 2
signatures, which is a great improvement from the 6 exponentials and 2 signatures
in version 2. However, version 3 seems to be moving flow 4 of version 2 into flow 2,
and the original flow 2 in version 2 is completely erased. Also, Alice’s exponential
in flow 3 of version 2 is also erased in version 3, with flow number unchanged. This
way, the number of overheads and its order have been changed and different from the





rB , αrA , ID(A))←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−
sigA(α
rA , αrB , ID(B))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
sk = αrArB sk = αrArB
Figure 6.6: STS-BCK Version 3
such modifications while preserving the security of the protocol, no proof is given
in the literature that this is secure, and the original paper does not propose any
concrete way (nor examples) of applying authenticators to key exchange protocols
(in the authenticated setting) and reducing the overheads while maintaining the
same level of security.
6.2.5 Discussions and Comments
Although some discussions are already mentioned while describing the construction
of STS-BCK via the modular approach, it is worthwhile to look at the design ap-
proach again and analyze the concept, range of applications, and potential problems
and future developments.
To start with, it is mentioned again that in the original paper ([BCK98]), the
concept and brief algorithm of constructing a secure key exchange protocol is given,
however, no concrete example is provided in the paper, and it may lead to misin-
terpretation of the content into vulnerable implementations. Also, Blake-Wilson
and Menezes’s interpretation of constructing STS-BCK version 3 is not straight-
forward. In the possibility of their interpretation making changes to the original
authenticator, it may yield a secure protocol, but with no proof (since the original
authenticator has been altered, a new model or new proof may be needed). The re-
duction also raises the concern that whether applying authenticators to secure key
exchange protocols in the authenticated setting will generate excessive overhead or
more protocol flows than necessary. However, [BCK98] does not seem to put much
emphasis on this issue. Also, how to optimize the real implementation with respect
to number of flows and amount of overheads, is still unclear from the paper.
Regardless of possible implementation issues, the concept of layering settings
via giving different limitations to adversaries may suggest a wider range of appli-
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cation of this concept. For example, the encryption based key “exchange” protocol
(proven secure in the authenticated links model) is in fact a key transport proto-
col. This implies that authenticators can also be applied to at least another usage
other than key exchange. Since authenticators give one way authentication only,
the application of authenticators can be used in constructing key establishment
protocols (key exchange, key transport, etc.) in various settings such as achieving
unilateral or mutual authentication and with or without key confirmation (if key
confirmation is achieved by simply having one additional flow in the protocol, e.g.
using a MAC).
The focus of [BCK98] is on key establishment between two entities in a dis-
tributed computing network. The intended setting of this paper is then very dif-
ferent from Bellare and Rogaway’s model in [BR93B] (which is intended for a gen-
eralization to group key distribution). One potential future work of such a model
may be generalizing the design methodology so that it also applies to the group
key distribution case.
6.3 The Progressive Approach: From Mutual Au-
thentication Protocols to Authenticated Key
Exchange
Another approach to the design of secure AKE protocols is based on modifying only
the essential parts in mutual authentication protocols to further achieve secure key
exchange. In other words, it start with a secure mutual authentication protocol,
then progressively change some of the components to achieve key exchange and thus
will be referred to as the progressive approach. The idea of progressive approaches
first appeared in [BR93B] by Bellare and Rogaway for group key distribution in the
secret-key cryptography setting. However, Bellare and Rogaway did not go into
details of designing a protocol; rather they only mentioned a secure AKE protocol
can be created using such an approach. In [BR93B], not only does every user shares
a secret key with another before the protocol starts, there was no need for integrity
and non-repudiation tools. The approach described in this section, however, is a
similar idea but in the asymmetric setting targeted to achieve authenticated key
exchange. Originally developed by Professor Doug Stinson, this idea was never
published but used as teaching material. The concept of this approach is similar
to what was suggested by Bellare and Rogaway but in an asymmetric setting. It
is believed that such a design methodology for the asymmetric setting may give an
alternative method of designing a secure key exchange protocol.
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The rest of this section is as follows: The assumption and the communication
model will be described, and some contrasts and similarities from the other models
will be mentioned. The concept of design approach is then discussed. The steps of
constructing a secure key exchange protocol are given, followed by an illustration
of constructing the same STS-BCK developed in [BCK98]. A complete proof of
security is given, and the method of proving security is also explained before the
description of the proof. Finally, some comments and discussions will be provided
to complete this subsection.
6.3.1 Setting and Assumptions
The setting described for this approach will be based on more intuitive notions
rather than a formalization of real life situations. This is done because (1) the
proof of the protocol security later does not require a formal model, and (2) it is
easier to understand the material.
Our computing environment is the normal distributed computing environment,
where each user and the adversary are polynomially bounded in computing power
as well as space. The asymmetric setting follows the traditional public key infras-
tructure (PKI): a trusted authority (TA) is present to issue legitimate certificates,
certify each user (including the adversary) and register their private and public key
pairs. The TA has a universal verification algorithm verTA to verify the validity
of certificates. We require that each user must have their private/public key pairs
registered as well as issued a certificate from TA before the user can start any
protocol run with any other user. Note that in Blake-Wilson and Menezes’ model,
although not explicitly specified, distribution (or registration) of public/private key
pairs and certificates also must be done prior to the start of the protocol.
In terms of security of signature schemes, we require the secure definition of
[MS04] (the secure signature scheme in the multi-user setting), and we emphasize
that each user must have a distinct public key, for otherwise one entity can imper-
sonate another very easily. To illustrate this point, suppose that A and B have the
same public key (the verification key) pskA = pskB. Note that their private key may
or may not be the same. Suppose A signs a message m using her private key (the
signing key) sskA to get s = sigsskA(m). In the verification process, the verify algo-
rithm is deterministic. That is, given the same key k and a signed message on m′
using k, sigk(m
′), the verification process verk(m′, sigk(m′)) will always return true.
Therefore, if pskA = pskB, then verpskA(s,m) = true, but also verpskB(s,m) = true.
Thus if B uses A’s signature as his own on message m, everyone would accept the
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verification process; impersonation occurs. This requirement of signature security
does not appear in [BR93B, BCK98, BWM97].
One practical concern about the enforcement of distinct public keys is that it
does not seem possible in practice. In most theoretical models, there is only one
TA, and it is very easy for a TA to verify that each user registers a different public
key than the others (also the TA can make sure that, when a user registers its
public key, the user must know the corresponding private key). However, in a real-
world setting such as North America, there is certainly more than one TAissuing
certificates and registering private/public keys. If two TAs use the same signature
scheme with the same security parameter and same generator of the group, it is very
likely that an entity A can register her public key to TA1 and another entity C can
register the same public key to TA2. Thus in situations where the communication
is conducted with the TAs off-line, A and C can impersonate each other.
The adversary’s ability is the same as in both the Bellare-Rogaway and Blake-
Wilson-Menezes model. However, we separate the ability of the adversary (and
thus the adversary) into two categories: passive attacks and active attacks. Passive
attacks consists of eavesdropping only; active attacks consists of message injection,
modification, dropping or delaying messages, impersonation, and known-session
key attacks. An adversary that only performs passive attacks is referred to as the
passive adversary, and an adversary that does both passive and active attacks are
referred to as an active adversary.
A secure mutual authentication protocol here is defined as one in which no
honest participant should accept after the adversary has been active. This definition
complies with the definition of mutual authentication in [BR93B].
Recall that [BR93B] defines mutual authentication as (1) if two (honest) parties
have matching conversations, then both parties should accept, and (2) (negligible
probability for No−Matching) the probability of one honest party accepting while
there is no other honest party engaging a matching conversation with it is negligible.
From the above, condition (1) certainly complies with our definition. Regarding
condition (2), note that No−Matching could happen only when an adversary is
active, and condition (2) requires that the honest participant should not accept
when active attacks happen. Thus condition (2) also complies with our definition.
The security of key exchange says that when both honest parties accept, the
adversary should not be able to learn any information about the session key.
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6.3.2 Design Concepts
The design concept follows directly from the separate treatment of mutual authen-
tication and key exchange: start with a secure mutual authentication protocol that
consists of random challenge and response technique, then replace each random
challenge with Diffie-Hellman exponentials to form a Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
Assumption: the random challenges and the Diffie-Hellman exponentials must be
chosen randomly from domains with the same distribution, usually a uniform dis-
tribution. The procedure of proving security also follows from the design principle:
first prove that the mutual authentication protocol is secure. Then, after replacing
the random challenges with DH exponentials, impersonation is not possible, so the
only active attack possible would be the known-session key attack. The security of
the key exchange protocol can be proven once it is shown secure against the known
session key attack. The steps in enumerated form are given as follows:
1. Design a mutual authentication protocol using random challenge and response
technique. Prove its security. Note that in order to show mutual authentica-
tion, two random challenges are needed.
2. Replace the two random challenges with Diffie-Hellman exponentials to form a
variation of Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. Let the resulting protocol
be called MADHKE (stands for “Mutual Authenticated Diffie-Hellman Key
Exchange”).
3. Prove the security of MADHKE given that impersonation is not possible. The
only way the adversary can retrieve information about the session key is
by either eavesdropping or participating in the protocol as a legitimate user
(using his own ID).
An illustration of this approach is given in Figure 6.7.
6.3.3 Construction of Secure Key Exchange Protocols with
the Example of STS
We now demonstrate an example of constructing a secure authenticated key ex-
change protocol via the steps above. The proof is given in the next subsection and
therefore only the construction is illustrated in this subsection.
We start by describing a secure mutual authentication protocol, which will be
denoted as MAP. If entities Alice (denoted by A) and B (denoted by Bob) wish to
authenticate themselves to each other, then
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Figure 6.8: The Secure Mutual Authentication Protocol (MAP)
1. Alice (the initiator) chooses a random challenge rA uniformly and randomly
from a particular domain D and sends CA and rA to Bob.
2. Bob (the responder) chooses a random challenge rB uniformly and randomly
from the same domain D. Bob computes
yB = sigB(rB, rA, ID(A))
and sends CB, rB, yB to Alice.
3. Alice verifies the validity of CB using verTA. Once verified, Alice extracts
Bob’s public key (the verification key) and verifies the validity of yB using
verB. If yB is not valid, then Alice outputs “reject” and terminates the session.
Otherwise, Alice outputs “accept”, she computes
yA = sigA(rA, rB, ID(B))
and then sends yA to Bob.
4. Bob verifies the validity of CA using verTA. Once verified, Bob extracts Alice’s
verification key and verifies the validity of yA using verA. If yA is not valid,
then Bob outputs “reject” and terminates the session. Otherwise, Bob out-
puts “accept” and the session is successful.
An illustration is shown in Figure 6.8
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The proof of MAP’s security is given in the next subsection.
Note that there are two transmissions of random challenges: one from Alice to
Bob and another one the other way around. Now replace those random challenges
with Diffie-Hellman exponentials. That is, instead of just sending the random
values rA and rB, send α
rA and αrB , where α is a generator of the group 〈α〉 ⊆ Zp,
and the order of α is some prime number q. It is required that choosing random
exponentials should follow the same distribution with choosing random numbers
and the DDH is intractable.
The resulting protocol becomes:
1. Alice chooses uniformly and randomly a random number rA ∈R Z∗q and sends
CA, α
rA to Bob.
2. Bob chooses uniformly and randomly a random number rB ∈R Z∗q and com-
putes yB = sigB(α
rB , αrA , ID(A)) and sends CB, rB, and yB to Alice.
3. Alice verifies the validity of CB using verTA and extracts Bob’s verification
key. Then Alice verifies the validity of yB using verB. If yB is not valid, then
Alice outputs “reject” and terminates this session. Otherwise, Alice computes
yA = sigA(α
rA , αrB , ID(B)) and sk = (αrB)rA = αrArB , she outputs “accept”,
and she sends yA to Bob.
4. Bob verifies the validity of CA using verTA and extracts Alice’s verification key.
Then Bob verifies the validity of yA using verA. If yA is not valid, then Bob
outputs “reject” and terminates the session. Otherwise, sk = (αrB)rA = αrArB
and Bob outputs “accept”; the protocol terminates successfully.
An illustration is shown in Figure 6.9.
Notice that the protocol STSMAP is identical to STS-BCK version 3 (see Fig-
ure 6.6) except for the exchange of certificates. The STS-BCK version 3 assumes
that certificates are exchanged prior to start of the protocol (see the model), and
in STSMAP the certificates are exchanged in protocol flows. In practice, the pro-
cess of exchanging certificates still needs to be authenticated, which leads back to
the same problem in authenticated key exchange. It is more practical and more
efficient to exchange certificates during protocol flows. When Alice (the initiator)
sends the random exponential in the first flow, she must indicate who she is at some
point in order for Bob to know who to send the message back to. This “return ad-
dress” feature can be done in the IP layer, where the return path is just the IP












rA , αrB , ID(B))−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
sk = (αrA)rB
“accept”
Figure 6.9: The STS derived from MAP (STSMAP)
flow, and since certificates contain Alice’s ID, then Bob would know who to send
the succeeding messages to. Therefore, we claim that the STS-BCK in practice
should be implemented in the same way as STSMAP, but the security of the two
are equivalent.
6.3.4 Proof of Security
The proof of security is separated into two parts: first prove that STSMAP is a
secure mutual authentication protocol, then prove it is also a secure authenticated
key exchange protocol under the assumption that the adversary cannot imperson-
ate any legitimate user (this is a consequence of being a mutual authentication
protocol).
Note that we believe the proof will suffice the security definition given by
[BWJM97]. Also, we believe the proof also cover Shoup’s comments of [BCK98]’s
security issues with the model. Briefly speaking, an adversary should be allowed
to be active even after it has queried the test oracle call. We claim that our proof,
which does not follow the structure of formal modelling, has taken the above sce-
nario into consideration so that the proof of security is valid in real life.
Assumptions
• CA and CB are public certificates issued by a trusted third party (TA), and
the validation of CA and CB can be verified by a public verification algorithm
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verTA. Also, the verification algorithm verA of A, (verB of B) can be ob-
tained from CA (and CB, respectively). The corresponding signing algorithm
(signature scheme) sigA and sigB are known only to A, B, respectively.
• A and B have perfect random number generators for exponents of α. Suppose
each random number is k bits, then the probability of one number occurring
is 1/2k (uniform distribution).
• The signature scheme is secure. That is, the probability of forging a valid sig-
nature scheme sig(x) after seeing q valid signatures sig(x1), sig(x2), ..., sig(xq)
is at most ε, where ε denotes a (supposedly) small quantity ≥ 0.
• verTA, CA, CB, verA, and verB are all publicly accessible and known to all
parties at the beginning of the protocol.
• Only Alice and Bob have access to sigA and sigB, respectively.
Proof that STSMAP is a secure mutual authentication protocol
Proof. Suppose on the contrary that STS is not a secure mutual authentication
protocol, then Oscar can either
1. impersonate Alice to Bob
2. impersonate Bob to Alice
3. impersonate both Alice and Bob to Bob and Alice, respectively.
The probability of Oscar’s success of impersonation is
max{Pr[case1], Pr[case2], Pr[case3]}.
Case1: Suppose Oscar impersonates A to B. That is, B “accepts” at the end of a
protocol run. This implies that in the third flow B receives y′A = sigA(a
′, αrB , ID(B)),
where a′ is the random exponential B receives in the first flow, and rB is the random
number generated by B, αrB is the value sent by B in the second flow. Now Oscar
may obtain a valid y′A in the following ways:
1. y′A is constructed by Oscar. By our assumption, Oscar has seen q valid sigA
signatures, thus he can only succeed with probability ε.
101
2. y′A has been previously constructed by A. The only way this could happen
is that Oscar replays an exponential a′ previously used by A, say, in session
i, and B sends the b′ he sends in session i. Let the previously viewed sig-
natures be s1 = sigA(ID(B)||αai1||αbi1), s2 = sigA(ID(B)||αai2||αbi2), ..., sq =
sigA(ID(B)||αaiq ||αbiq), and let S = {s1, s2, ..., sq}. Let Sa′ be the set of dis-
tinct αaij , j = 1..q in S, and define two elements a′ = αa and b′ = αb to be
associated if ∃s ∈ S such that s = sigA(ID(B)||a′||b′). Let Sa′(αb) be the list
of αb’s that are associated with a′. Note that in Sa′(αb) there might be identi-
cal elements (since it’s a list instead of a set). let Sa′ = {a′1, a′2, ..., a′t} and let
|Sa′1(αb)| = q1, |Sa′2(αb)| = q2, ..., |Sa′t(αb)| = qt. Note that q1 +q2 + ...+qt = q.
Thus,
Pr[Oscar uses a previously observed signature by A]
= Pr[Oscar sends an α′ ∈ Sa′ in the first flow




Pr[Oscar sends an α′i in the first flow









Pr[B sends an αb associated with α′i| Oscar sends α′i]

















Therefore, the probability of Oscar impersonating A using q previously ob-
served signature is at most q/2k.
3. If y′A is previously constructed by B, notice that B only constructs signatures
of the form sigB(ID(A)||αb||αa), so this scenario does not happen.
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Therefore, Pr[Oscar impersonates A] ≤ q/2k + ε.
Case2: Suppose Oscar impersonates B to A, then A receives y′B = sigB(ID(A)||b′||a′),
where a′ is sent by A to Oscar in the first flow, and b′ is the value sent along with
y′B in the second flow. Oscar can do this via
1. constructing y′B himself. By our assumption the probability of achieving this
is ≤ ε.
2. using a previous signature by A. This is not possible by similar argument as
before.
3. using a previous signature by B. As long as A sends an a′ ∈ Sa′ , then there
exists a signature sigB(ID(A)||b′||a′) ∈ S for some b′. Therefore,
Pr[Oscar attacks using a previous signature by B]






Therefore, the total probability of Oscar impersonating B is ≤ q/2k + ε.
Case3: The third case which Oscar impersonates both A and B is definitely
harder than the previous two cases, thus the probability of Oscar impersonating A
and B is ≤ q/2k + ε.
Therefore, the probability of Oscar’s success of impersonation is at most ≤
q/2k + ε. The security of STSMAP’s mutual identification feature has been estab-
lished as a function of security of its underlying primitives (the signature scheme
and the random number generator). Since we assume that the signature scheme
is secure and the random number generator is perfectly random, we conclude that
STSMAP is a secure mutual authentication protocol.
Proof that STSMAP is a secure authenticated key exchange protocol
Proof. The proof is conducted in 3 steps. First, we show that a passive attacker can
break the protocol no more easily than solving the decision Diffie-Hellman problem
(DDH). The second step is to show that STS-BCK is a secure protocol under mutual
authentication. This ensures that an active attacker can only impersonate either
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Alice or Bob with a small probability ε′. The third step is to show that active
attackers without impersonation can succeed no more easily than solving DDH.
Recall that the DDH problem is: given a (β1 = α
a1 , β2 = α
a2 , β3) tuple, is
β3 = α
a1a2?
Step 1: Suppose Oscar’s goal is to learn some information about the session key
sk. Since this information can be arbitrary, we can model the adversary’s gain of this
piece of information by allowing the adversary to tell the real session key from any
other random key with non-negligible probability. In terms of the previous formal
models, the adversary can guess the random bit test generates with probability non-
negligibly greater than 1/2. Suppose Oscar has an polynomial-time oracle O such
that it can return some information about the session key sk = αab given inputs
β1 = α
a, β2 = α
b, and many valid transcript information tuples (αa1 , αb1 , sk1),
(αa2 , αb2 , sk2), . . . , (α
aq , αbq , skq) with probability 1/2 + ε, where ε > 0. Here, ai,
bi, are generated by a perfect random number generator, and thus the α
ais and
αbis follow a particular distribution D. We claim that Oscar can use this oracle to
solve DDH, thus the oracle should not exist (with run time complexity polynomial,
anyway).
Given the problem instance (β1 = α
a, β2 = α
b, β3), Oscar can generate ran-
dom numbers a1, a2, . . . , aq, b1, b2, . . . , bq, and compute triples (α
a1 , αb1 , αa1b1),
(αa2 , αb2 , αa2b2), . . . , (αaq , αbq , αaqbq). These tuples follow the distribution D of the
observed tuples in some legitimate STS sessions. Now Oscar calls
O(β1 = αa, β2 = αb, (αa1 , αb1 , αa1b1), (αa2 , αb2 , αa2b2), . . . , (αaq , αbq , αaqbq))
and retrieves to get the information about the session key skin polynomial time.
Now Oscar is able to tell if sk= β3 with a probability non-negligibly greater than
1/2, and thus can answer the DDH problem with probability non-negligibly greater
than 1/2. Thus Oscar has solved DDH in polynomial time, i.e. we have a reduction.
Step 2: We have proven from previous section that STS is a secure mutual
authentication protocol with small probability of success (say ε′). Thus the proba-
bility of Oscar getting the session key sk via impersonation is at most ε′ (assuming
active attacks of Oscar).
Step 3: Assume that Oscar actively attacks the protocol without impersonation.
Then the only way for Oscar to actively attack the protocol is to legitimately
participate in the protocol. There are two scenarios to Oscar’s participation: (1)
Oscar plays the initiator of the protocol and (2) Oscar plays the responder. In
scenario (1), Oscar picks a β1 ∈ 〈α〉 according to a certain rule, say RGO (the word
“regel” means rule in German) and sends β1 to his partner Bob. Bob returns a β2 =
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αb where b is chosen by a perfect random number generator (by our assumption).
Note that in the proof of STS’s security as a key exchange protocol, the third flow
is irrelevant.
In Scenario 2, Oscar receives a β1 = α
a from an initiator Alice and returns
β2 ∈〈α〉 according to his rule RGO.
That means, if Oscar actively attacks, then one of β1, β2 is chosen by Oscar
according to his rule RGO, and the other one is chosen by a perfect RNG.
However, such transcript tuples can be easily generated by Oscar himself using
the following method: Let T = {(βi1, βi2, ski)|i = 1..q} be the set of all q transcript
tuples Oscar records through participating legitimately in the protocol. Oscar can
simulate T by creating βi1 according to his rule RGO, and then using a perfect RNG
to get random numbers ri, and then creating β
i
2 ← αri . The corresponding session
key ski can be computed as ski = (βi1)
ri (note that βi1 is of the form α
rj and the ses-
sion key is supposed to be αrirj). If a certain number, tr, of transcript tuples where
Oscar being the responder is needed, then Oscar can pick Tr = {(βi1, βi2, ski)|i =
1 . . . tr} and create Tr′ = {(βi1′, βi2′, ski)|βi1′ = βi2′, i = 1 . . . tr} to replace Tr.
Therefore, if there exists an oracle O that can take T, β1 = αr1 , β2 = αr2 , and
output sk = αr1r2 , then providing T ′ = {(βi1, βi2, ski)|i = 1 . . . q} the set of transcript
tuples simulated by Oscar (he may be playing both the initiator and the responder)
and β1, β2, the oracle is still able to output sk. Thus participating in the protocol
does not give Oscar more advantage to break STS. Therefore, active attacks do not
give Oscar more advantage of breaking STS.
From Step 1 to Step 3, STS is a secure protocol under key exchange with
success probability max{ε, ε′} where ε is the probability of solving DDH, and ε′ is
the probability of success with passive attacks.
6.3.5 Discussions and Comments
The progressive approach described in this subsection takes place in the asymmetric
setting with side cryptographic tools such as signature schemes, TAs, and certifi-
cates. Although similar ideas have appeared in [BR93B], the settings and thus the
steps of building a secure authenticated key exchange protocol are different.
Unlike the formalism and general description in [BCK98], the progressive ap-
proach focuses on concrete guidelines for building a secure protocol and gives the
proof of security. The proof is given in a very intuitive way, yet not sacrificing its
completeness and correctness. Although formalism is perhaps the preferred way of
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proofs mathematically, the “intuitive” proof serves a better tool for understanding
the material and is a better lecture tool for explaining difficult concepts.
Regarding the methodologies of proving security, our approach first limits the
adversary’s ability to passive attacks and known-session-key attacks by proving the
protocol is a secure mutual authentication protocol. Then the second step is to
show that the additional ability of known-session-key attack does not enable the
adversary to have more effect than attacking passively. This particular concept
is similar to the modular approach: where the adversary’s ability varies in three
different settings, and the ultimate goal is to show that the protocol allows the
adversary in the unauthenticated setting to do no more than what it can do in an
ideal setting (in that setting the adversary is not powerful).
In this approach, the way of proving the protocol secure against the known-
session-key attack is separated from the other attacks; the way of proving security is
by way of simulation, proving that whatever information the adversary can retrieve
by requesting session keys can be done by passively simulating the process itself.
This part does not seem to appear is any other formal models or approaches.
The concept of the progressive approach is to start by having an existing pro-
tocol (note, however, that this “existing” protocol may need to be designed from
scratch in some cases) and modifying the random challenges without changing too
many attributes of the protocol (e.g. the number of flows, amount of overheads,
distribution of certain probabilistic processes, etc.). It is a very simple yet effective
process, in both theory and practice. However, this approach focuses only on the
key exchange process in the asymmetric setting, and it also requires very specific
type of mutual authentication protocols and key exchange processes to start with.
In a way the variety of protocols produced from this approach may seem very lim-
ited. However, after surveying in the literature on the existing protocols for mutual
authentication and key exchange, the only secure way of key exchange in practice
seems to be Diffie-Hellman (for its straight-forward way of providing forward se-
crecy), and the only secure way of mutual authentication seems to involve two-way
challenge-response using random challenges. In simple words, the secure tools are
pretty much limited, thus the limitation of our approach is not a big issue. It is
an open question if this approach can scale to more general purposes such as key
transport, unilateral authentication, and key distribution.
Note that the resulting protocol is identical to STS-BCK described in the previ-
ous section, and thus it also possesses the desired features of a secure AKE protocol.
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6.4 Comparison of the Two Approaches
This subsection concludes the above description of the two approaches to designing
a secure authenticated key exchange protocol. Some words and discussions may
seem redundant as they have appeared in previous subsections, but it is a side-by-
side comparison, so the reader may get a more clear understanding of the differences
between the two design methodologies. This subsection does not focus on issues of
clarity, concreteness, or correctness. It is merely comparing the “effects” provided
by the concepts and procedures. Future researchers or practitioners may adapt
their preferred approach based on the attributes they need by the information in
this subsection.
• Design Concepts:
The modular approach suggests to take a key exchange protocol, proven to
be secure in the authenticated setting, then add an authenticator to form an
authenticated key exchange protocol in the “real world”.
The progressive approach suggests to start with a secure mutual authentica-
tion protocol that uses random challenges, then replace each random challenge
with Diffie-Hellman exponentials to become a Diffie-Hellman based authenti-
cated key exchange protocol.
• Compatibility of Components:
In modular approach, any combination of key exchange protocols (secure in
the authenticated setting) and authenticators can result in a secure authen-
ticated key exchange protocol (in theory).
Specific to this version of progressive approach, the mutual authentication
protocol must use random challenges in a two-way challenge-response mode.
The key exchange protocol applied has to be Diffie-Hellman exponentials or
any other similar mechanism that exchanges two random values. In the gener-
alization case (if there is one), then the “nature” of the mutual authentication
protocol is tightly bounded to the choices of key exchange mechanisms. It
perhaps does not offer a very wide range of compatibilities between the two
components of authenticated key exchange protocols.
• Overheads and the Resulting Protocol:
Although the authenticators guarantees the messages transferred in the flows
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are authenticated, the resulting protocol seems to contain a large number of
protocol flows and overheads. There is no mention in the paper of a clear
way to reduce the number of flows or the amount of overheads in the general
case. If no general way of reducing the number of flows or the overheads
exists, the modular approach may be mainly of theoretical interest over an
implementation possibility.
The progressive approach only replaces the two random values (from any do-
main) with two random Diffie-Hellman exponentials. The number of flows
needed in the resulting protocol is the same as the starting mutual authen-
tication protocol, and there is no increased overhead associated with this
procedure if we assume the original two random values are picked from a
subset of the Diffie-Hellman key space.
• Ways of Proving Security:
In [BCK98], the way of proving security is “modularized”; There are two com-
ponents of the proof. One is to (1) prove a key exchange protocol is secure in
the authenticated links model through emulation, another is to (2) prove that
a “compiler” that makes a protocol emulates another protocol is an authen-
ticator. In the above sections, examples of proofs have been demonstrated,
and it is thought not difficult to follow the pattern of proofs. More conve-
niently, if the developed protocols uses a key exchange protocol that’s proven
to be secure in the authenticated setting already, and the protocol also uses
a proven secure authenticator, then there is no proof needed for the resulting
protocol.
Protocols developed via following the progressive approach are rather “sys-
tematic”. First one needs to prove the security of a mutual authentication
protocol, thus the adversary’s ability is limited to passive attacks and known-
session-key attacks. One then shows the resulting protocol is secure against
only passive attacks based on the limitation of adversary. The third step is to
show that a passive attacker with the additional ability of known-session-key
attack cannot gain more information than being just a passive attacker. For
any new combination of mutual authentication protocols and the correspond-
ing key exchange process, a new proof is needed, but the “outline” of the
proof is clear and can be easily followed.
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Chapter 7
Future Work and Conclusion
7.1 Summary of Thesis
This thesis is focused on the design and features (Topic) of authenticated key
exchange protocols (Theme) between two entities using public-key cryptography
(Setting).
In this thesis, the desired properties and features of an authenticated key ex-
change protocol is analyzed through a case study of different variations of the
Station-to-Station (STS) protocol. During the case study, many forms of STS are
brought up, and an attack is demonstrated to show the insecurity of lacking a cer-
tain feature, then another variation of STS is introduced, and so forth. The final
version mentioned in the case study, referred to as STS-BCK, is proven secure in
[BCK98] and is used in almost all industrial standards of authenticated key ex-
change in the setting considered in this paper. It is believed that the features we
analyzed is sufficient for the Setting.
During the survey phase of completing the thesis, it was noticed that there are
essentially two approaches to designing a secure authenticated key exchange pro-
tocol. The reason for having such little researches into this topic remains unknown
at this point, but I do believe having an explicit design will surely connect the
theory behind a cryptosystem and the real implementation. Two approaches are
analyzed and described in this thesis. One is a previous work by Bellare, Canetti,
and Krawczyk; another is suggested by my supervisor, Professor Doug Stinson,
during his lectures and our private conversation. These two approaches and their
supporting materials are very different, but I have translated the different materials
into one common language and showed these two design methodologies both lead
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to secure authenticated key exchange protocols by demonstrating the example of
STS. I have analyzed these two approaches from several different aspects, including
range of application, possibilities of forming practical implementation, and some
comments on modelling and ways they approach the definition of security. I believe
it is the first work of its kind, and should be carried on further in the future.
7.2 Contribution
• Conducted a complete survey on the development of the STS protocol.
• Presented previous work of attacks and fixes of STS, and compiled a list of
desired features of secure STS protocol.
• Studied and presented the modular approach of designing secure AKE proto-
cols in [BCK98].
• Developed an original design methodology to secure AKE protocols. An ex-
ample of applying such design methodology is given, and the resulting proto-
col is provided with a proof of security.
• Compared the two design methodologies with respect to design structure,
range of application, and ways of proving security, etc.
7.3 Future Work
During the case study, some side issues associated with authentication and key ex-
change are also looked at. These issues are (1) the security of signature schemes
in multi-user settings, (2) definition of mutual authentication and unilateral au-
thentication, and the best choice for authenticated key exchange, and (3) format
of certificates and the best time and place to exchange them. I believe these issues
are all very interesting and can be potential future work opportunities. Addition-
ally, the study of desired properties can be carried forward to different protocols in
different settings and themes.
Regarding the design methodologies, it is the author’s desire to see secure au-
thenticated key exchange protocols being implemented and proven secure with less
time and more certainty. Some possible future work is (1) creating more design
methodologies in different themes (e.g. key transport, key distribution, encryption,
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and signatures) and different settings (e.g. distributed computing environment,
with timestamps, and ID- or password-based cryptosystems).
The setting used in this thesis resembles the Internet. It is thought to be the
most appropriate setting for this research. However, this particular setting may not
be the same as real life for many practical reasons, and the setting can only resemble
so many real world settings. Issues such as the certification process, distinct public
keys for each entity, and cases of multiple certifying/trusted authority can all be
looked at in further detail to help provide a better structure of internet security.
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